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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
The workmen’s compensation laws passed by the British Parliament 
between 1860 and 1906 did not reach the statute books in a historical vacuum. 
The late Victorian years were years of political reforms (as exemplified 
by Disraeli's Reform Act of 1867 and Gladstone’s Reform Act of 1884)! of 
imperical reforms (as exemplified by the Commonwealth of Australia Act of 
1900)! and« most of a ll , of social reforms which laid the groundwork for the 
twentieth-century welfare state. The Education Act of 1870 was only one of 
several important statutes that undermined the Laissez-Faire predilections 
of the disciples of Adam Smith and of their late-Victorian Social Darwinist 
sympathizers. The British state was showing increasing responsibility 
towards the social concerns of its people.
Social reform was not limited to Great Britain. Both Germany and 
France were busy during the later nineteenth century with various legisla­
tive move8 to provide workers with rights, to allow a greater number of 
citizens to vote, and to, generally, institute social safeguards for their 
people. In the United States, the years after the Civil War (post 1865) 
brought about a great deal of change, notably the "Civil War Amendments" 
giving citizenship to former slaves and ensuring due process in legal mat­
ters to all citizens. Therefore, Great Britain could L j viewed as simply 
being caught up in the tide of reform.
In looking at the development of Workmen's Compensation, it is also 
important to note the effect of industry on the subject. Great Britain's 
industrial might was growing, and large industries such as mining, railways, 
engineering, and quarrying were employing thousands of workers. The days
1
2of the craftsman and his apprentice were drawing to an end as mass produc­
tion moved ahead. Tnese growing trades were dangerous. There were few 
health and safety laws and often those that existed were violated by 
employer and employee alike. A mining explosion that killed fifty men in 
one pit was a common occurrence. Enginemen and switchmen were equally 
vulnerable on the railroad lines. Evr* farm laborers were not immune with 
the growth of heavy farm machinery to harvest! thresh, and plow. The 
growth of industry, while it may have brought better wages and better living 
conditions, also carried with it a high price in death and injury.
Another factor which influenced Workmen's Compensation legislation 
was the growth of trade unions and the election into Parliament of men with 
labour backgrounds, Trade unions gave the workers a united voioe with which 
to respond to the employers' demands. The Trades Union Council, the Miners 
National Union, and other groups became the quasi-legal representatives of 
the workers. They helped to make the workers aware of their rights, they 
organized the workers, and most importantly; they continually sought the 
Government's attention through studies, speeches, and private conversations 
with M .P . 's .  But they could not influence Parliament enough until workers 
themselves became members of Parliament. Foremost among those of worker 
background who were involved in the liability debates was the untiring 
Alexander MacDonald whose efforts helped bring about the 1880 Employers' 
Liability Act. Others who followed him, such as Thomas Burt and Henry 
Broadhurst, e m  to it that the workers were never forgotten amid the bureau­
cratic red tape.
The 1838 Priestley v, Fowler decision does seem to have instigated 
the debate on employer liability . Prior to 1838 there simply are no records
3of either case* or attempted legislation on employer liability . Surely 
there were incidents of employees injured at work. However, it can be 
assumed that they were not viewed as vital in either a legal or a moral 
sense until the nineteenth century period of social reform had begun.
The issue though is whether the development of Workmen's Compensation 
was solely part of the general pattern of social legislation in the late 
Victorian years or whether it contained within it certain special charac­
teristics not consistent with other social refonas of the time. Can a 
natural progression be traced in examining the acts of 1880, 1897, 1900, and 
1906? Did each act give birth to the next act by virtue of unresolved 
issues or was each act separate unto itself with little discernable correla­
tion to the other acts? Were the early court rulings, beginning with the 
Priestley decision, truly the instigators of the 1876-1877 Select Committee 
Hearings or merely unrelated events? Can the first compensation act, the 
I860 Employers' Liability Act, be considered as a commoi oase upon which the 
subsequent legislation was enacted?
Furthermore, if a pattern can be traced, was it significant? Did it 
imply that Great Britain was truly becoming more socially responsible or 
simply reflecting the political climate of the day? This is a valid prob­
lem because the Parliamentary debates occasioned by each measure were 
littered with dire warnings and idealistic pledges. Even as late as 1906, 
there were some M .P . 's  who refused to accept the premise that an employer 
should be responsible for his employees. Similarly, there were the ideal­
istic M .P .'s  who felt that only by being made legally responsible could an 
employer consider himself a moral person.
What in sun did this series of acts signify? Was it a partisan 
movement from its inception or were all political parties actively involved
4in its development? Was it merely a superficial struggle between master and 
servant or did it have deeper, more widespread implications? This paper 
begins at the initial stage of the process that brought about Workmen's 
Compensation. The ancient maxims and the landmark decisions are examined 
first so that the legal foundation of employer liability may be understood. 
The hearings in 1676-1877 are equally important because they demonstrate 
where and how the battle lines were drawn for the future. Each Act and the 
methods which were used to bring it to fruition will then be discussed. The 
purpose of this examination is to attempt to discern whether or not a pat­
tern oxists, if so what type of pattern it is« and the eventual significance 
of the findings. The paper spans the period from 1838 to 1906 in this 
attempt.
5CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND OF THE CONCEPT AND LANDMARK DECISIONS
The concept of an employer being liable for the acts of his servant 
did not originate with the 1880 rlability Act nor even with an earlier 
decree set forth by Charles I I . The concept dates back to the Roman Empire 
and it is to Roman law that the ori/ins of employer responsibility ?jid lia­
bility may be traced. Roman civil law stated: "If a slave committed a 
delict by his master's orders, the master alone was answerable and even when 
the master could have prevented the wrong, the injured person had the right 
to action against the master."* The only way a master could escape the 
liability was if he surrendered his slave or if the slave died before a 
judgement could be brought. The action, therefore, died with the slave, a 
premise consistent with tort law at that time.
The Roman law translated it3elf into English tort law known by the
maxim, Respondeat Superior: the master will answer for the acts of his
2
servant. Its earliest finding is in the concluding section of the Statute 
of Westminster I I , c. 11, during the 13th year of the reign of Edward I 
(1285 ). This maxim is the formula to use in applying liability to its 
source. It denotes the basic responsibility and where such responsibility 
lies. It does not, however, explain why the master should be liable for 
M s  servant's actions.
Thomas Beven, Negligence in Law (London, 1895); Vol. I , p. 572.
Alfred Ruegg, K .C ., Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation 
(London, 1910); p. 11.
*
6For the why of liability another maxim is necensary: Qui facit per
3
alium facit per se. He who acts by another acts for himself. If  the 
master ordered his servant to do something, arvy and all consequences of his 
order were to be his responsibility. Although the responsibility was lim­
ited to only those events which occurred in the course of the employee's 
duties, it widened the principle of employer liability. Thomas Beven, 
Barrister of the Inner Temple, in commenting on this maxim wrote: "The
principle at the bottom of this very extensive liability is an irrebutable 
presumption - that the master authorized every act done in advancement of
4
the master's business, pending the authority, and covered by its objects."
It is now clear why Respondeat Superior was a responsibility and how 
such responsibility would be used. Put together, the principle behind the 
two maxims stated that a master was liable for the acts of his servant while 
the latter was performing seme duty assigned to him. The grounds for such 
a principle were that the true principal ( i .e . ,  the employer) of such an 
act should be responsible for its consequences and that such responsibility 
should go hand in hand with the benefits of the relationship between prin­
cipal and assignee.
The concept of liability as just stated and as it grew and developed,
5
can be found in the Yearbooks under both Henry IV and Henry V I . Under 
Charles I , the principle was restated: "If  a servant keep his master's
Beven, p. 573. 
Beven, p. 574.
5
Ib id ., p. 576.
7fire negligently, an action lies against the master."6 In all these cases 
the liability alluded to was where a servant's action brought damage to a 
strauger. This is fairly simple to comprehend. The master-servant 
relationship was very much a one-to-one type. Employers in business 
usually hired one assistant, as with a blacksmith and his journeyman or a 
grain seller and his clerk. Servants working in the houses or on the 
grounds of their masters were more numerous but even they worked under at 
least a perception of one-to-one relations. This leads to the conclusion 
that familiarity with employer, coupled with little or no education and a 
steadfast belief in the status quo, led the employees to not question 
whether liability of the employer applied only to strangers.
The actions brought against masters were in the nature of liability 
towards a stranger. Thus a string of cases (Michael v. Alestree, Kingston 
v. Booth, Tuberville v. Stamps, and Jones v. Hart) preceded the case that 
was to mark a definite deviation in the concept of employer liability . 
Priestley v. Fowler7 was originally heard in 1836 at the Linconshire Summer 
Assizes. The case consisted of the following: A servant was directed by
his master to go with another servant on a wagon full of items to be deliv­
ered to some shop. The servant, Priestley, did this. The wagon was appar­
ently overloaded and broke down. This caused the servant to be thrown to 
the ground whereupon he broke his thigh. The servant sued the employer 
holding him responsible for the wagon being overloaded and for ordering
Ib id ., p. 576.
English Reports, Full Reprint, Vol. 150, p. 1030.
8the plaintiff to get on the wagon. In the Assizes, Priestley proved Fowler
0
liable and Fowler was fined L I00.
The case was then taken on appeal to the Lord Justices of the
Exchequer where judgement was rendered in 1838. Lord Abinger, Chief Baron,
determined the question to be whether an employer who directs his employee
to perform a certain duty, in this case delivery of the goods on the wagon,
should be held liable when, in performance of the duty, the employee is
injured. In his opinion, he ruled, "...the  mere relation of the master and
the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take
more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of him- 
9
s e lf ."  He ruled therefore to reverse the lower court decision on the
grounds that the claim "contained no premise from which the duty of the
X 0
defendant. . .could be inferred in law." His ruling set forth a clear 
statement: an employer could not be held liable for injury to his servant
because no law existed to uphold it.
Following the Priestley decision, an American case further emphasized 
the concept of non-liability and added another reason for why such liability 
could not exist. Farwe11 v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation*^ 
was an 1842 case heard in the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. A railroad engineer, Farwell, had been injured during the 
course of a run due to the fault of a switch man. The justices, citing
Revised Reports, Vo.1 . 49, p. 497.
English Reports, Vol. 150, p. 1032.
Law Journals, Exchequer Court, Vol. 7, p. 42. 
Revised Reports, Vol. 14- p. 262.
9Priestley v, Fowler, said that any implied contract of indemnity between a
master and his servant does not exist as it relates to deunages received from
a fellow servant. In their words, "each employee is an observer of the
12
conduct of the o th e rs ..."  because their respective safety depends on the
actions of each other. Furthermore, the justices added, if precautions are
not taken by the employer, the employee is free to leave the job.
The implication of the Farwell decision lay in the legal exemption
it set forth. The concept of "common employment", hinted at in the
Priestley case, was now stated in full. Ruegg defined "common employment"
thus: "If  the person occasioning and the person suffering injury are fellow
workmen engaged in a'Common employment"and having a common master, such
13
master is not responsible lor the consequences of the injury." "Common 
employment" was the final seal of protection needed by employers against 
liability . The employer was now not responsible for his servant's injury 
when done by another servant because of "common employment." In the next 
few years, common employment would grew to include a great variety of 
situations.
Ironically, in 1846, the Fatal Accident Act, better known as Lord 
Campbell's Act, was passed, giving workmen's survivors rights of legal 
action. Previous to the act, all personal actions died with the person 
entitled to bring it. This was perhaps a tort maxim preserved frem Roman 
law and a reasonable supposition is that industrialization and increased
Ib id ., p. 165. 
Ruegg, p. 15.
10
fatalities brought about this particular act. It provided that if a workman
was killed while employed at the time of death, his estate could lay a claim
14
against the employer. It should be noted that negligence and direct 
involvement of the employer had to be proven in order that the claim be 
good. While the act provided a long-needed change in the realm of tort 
claims, the specter of "common employment*' coupled with the factor that 
growing industrialization was removing the employer from direct involvement 
with the employee in effect nullified the major intent of Lord Campbell's 
Act.
Four cases after Farwell and the 1846 Fatal Accident Act reinforced
the legal concept of "common employment" and changed it from a judge's
ruling to a maxim. It was never to be fully eliminated though changes in
the law would eventually render it a powerless excuse. The first case,
15
Hutchinson v. The York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railroad Company, was 
ruled on in 1850. The facts were that an engineer of the rail line was 
killed in a collision between his train and another train belonging to the 
same company. Despite the plaintiff 's  claim that a servant should have the 
same remedy that a stranger might have and that to nullify this remedy for 
the servant implied a nullification for a stranger, the defendant's case was 
upheld. Justice Aldereon, in his ruling, based the defendant's rights on 
three proposals: that the common employment of Hutchinson with the 
employees in the other train negated the employer's responsibility, that 
any risks in the job were implicitly accepted when agreeing to employment,
14
Ruegg, P* 14.
15
Law Journals, Vol. 19, p. 296.
and that if the employer carefully selected his workmen he could not be held
responsible for their subsequent actions . ^  This case thus reaffirmed the
concept of "common employment" by saying that an injury caused by a fellow
servant was a risk contracted between master and servant upon hiring.
17
The second case, Wigmore v. Jay, was ruled on by Justice Pollock only 
a few days after the Hutchinson decision. In this case an employee of an 
engineering firm was killed by the fall of some scaffolding erected by other 
employees. The deceased, though employed as an errand boy and thus having 
nothing to do with the actual construction, was ruled to be in "common 
employment" with the builders of the scaffold. Such "common employment", 
according to Justice Pollock, ruled out any possibility of employer 
liability.
18
Barton’ s Hill Coal Company v. Reid, ruled on in 1853, was an extrem­
ely important decision. Where the Priestley ruling held that employers 
could not be held liable and the Hutchinson case ruled that the risks of 
the job were an implied contract between master and servant, Barton’s Hill
firmly established "common employment" as a "principle of universal appli- 
19
cation." The case originated in Scotland where Reid, a miner employed by 
Barton's Hill Coal Company, was killed when being raised from a shaft. The 
operator of the engine which raised a cage up, neglected to stop the engine
11
16
17
18
Law Journals, Vol. 19, p. 299. 
Ibid ., p. 300.
Jurist Reports, Vol. 4, p. 767.
19
Ibid ., p. 770.
12
whan Reid wee at the platform of the mine. The cage, containing Reid and
another miner* was dashed against the scaffold platform where it was over-
20
turned* throwing Reid to the ground from a height of about sixty feet.
The Scottish Court awarded Reid's widow with an unnamed amount of comp»nsa-
tion. The coal company immediately took the case to the House of Lords for
appeal on the Scottish ruling. In his ruling* Lord Cranworth* Chancellor*
stated that both men we.e "contributing directly to the common object of
21
their common employer in bringing the coal to the surface." He did not
feel that both men had to be engaged in the same work in order to be held in
"common employment." Then* abolishing any differential treatment in the
British Realm he stated: "The law as established in England is founded on
principles of universal application* not on any peculiarities of English
jurisprudence; and unless* therefore* there has been a settled course of
decision in Scotland to the contrary ..." the same law should apply in
22
Scotland as it does in England. This case in effect gave "common employ­
ment" a judicial status in England and Scotland.
23
The last of the four cases took place in 1876. Lovell v. Howell 
served to reinforce the risk of employment. In ruling against the plaintiff* 
Justice Archibald stated that, "The principle of the master's exemption is 
that the servant in return for his wages tacitly undertakes to bear all 
ordinary risks of his employment, of which the risk from negligence of *213
Jurist Reports* Vol. 4 , p. 768.
21
Charles M. Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant (London, 
1906); p. 19P.
22 Jurist Reports, Vol. 4 , p. 770.
23
Weekly Reporter, Common Pleas Division, Vol. 24, p. 672.
13
fellow-servants is one.M The importance of Lovell is that injury from 
fellow servants was now considered an ordinary risk. This signified that an 
implied contract was not even necessary to claim exemption. The sks were 
now an ordinary, regular part of the job involving no contractua obliga­
tions .
What these cases and others of the same period suggested was that 
" conmon employment" would now be a proper defense against any claim, notwith­
standing the 1846 Fatal Accident Act. The one-to-one relationship of master 
and servant which would have allowed legal action even in the case where the 
servant was killed was rapidly changing to a situation of an employer who 
had agents working for him who would be judged to be in "common employment" 
with the plaintiff. Various such "commonly employed" people shewed up in 
the courts as time went by: a captain and his crew were held in "common
employment" as were a miner and an "underlooker" who supervised mini g 
operations. A guard at a railroad station and a platelayer laying down 
railroad tracks were "commonly employed." The foreman of a gam of k 
folders and one of the scaffolders were also; so tor were a ma ig e r o f 
barges and a man employed in lowering sacks onto the barges
Several things were apparent by 1876. A Common Law m n :i nt
Roman Law) doctrine, that of a mister being answerabl o r  he u ts f his
servant, had been constricted first to those acts c :c ig m i l e  r  h
performance of duty and second or ly  to those acts w u r a: nod o i  e c t
a "stranger." The maxim of Qui far it per aliun f a c ta  , (He who a ts
by another acts for himself) had g. * *n way to Vo n u  n t injuria Mo
24
24
Ib id ., p. 672.
14
wrong arises to one consenting). Out of these occurences, “common employ 
ment " ,  the perfect justification and rationalization for non-liability in 
the employer, was born. But a "law" existed now for which no statute had 
been enacted and which had grown on several judicial decisions, one fol­
lowing another and each adding to the last.
Common employment was thus, a judge-made law. It began as a ather 
modest concept rationalizing why employers could not be held liable for 
their servants' injuries. The concept of implied risk and hence implied 
contract between master and servant was added. The final addition was the 
finding that all workers besides the master, whatever their duties were, 
were in "common employment" with each other. From that point, the ideology 
of "common employment" was seemingly engraved in British Law. It can be 
argued that it was a practical concept, born out of the necessity of 
employers having to protect themselves from excess litigation. But it was 
also an illogical proposition. In terms of contract, a man who through an 
agent sold goods to another and then refused to deliver, was still liable 
for the delivery of the goods. Why then would a person using an agent 
( i .e . ,  an employee) not be liable for his agent's actions towards his 
employees ?
The concept of liability to a servant and the judicial protection that 
arose in opposition were perhaps related to the growing industrialization 
of Great Britain. Certainly there are no records of employees suing for 
compensation before the Priestley case. No doubt injury did occur. Perhaps 
t < n in the growth of mining, engineering, quarrying, and the
b ad indui in h • late 18th and early 19th Centuries. The risk of 
r v and c r < re injury were high in these fields. Related to
15
the growth of these industries wars the fact that more and more men were 
being employed in these areas and as explained above the one-to-one relation 
of master and servant was changing to a situation of a larger employer with 
many employees and with agents or foremen who supervised the workers. How­
ever , this is all assumption. The hard fact was that a judge-made law was 
in existence.
The mid-19th Century in Great Britain is reknown as the initial per­
iod of social reform in both criminal and civil areas. Therefore, it was 
only natural that Parliament should look at employer liability as one of 
many reforms needed. That there was already a legal claim to liability , 
if the employer was personally involved and if direct negligence could be 
proveni was a fairly solid fact. What was now needed was a means to make a 
legal claim if either one or both of those requirements was absent. The 
ramifications of such legal rights were to affect the industrial world in a 
manner still relevant today.
CHAPTER 3 - 1876 and 1877 SELECT COMMITTEE HEARINGS AND REPORT
In 1876, as a result of a Bill presented to Parliament by Alexander 
MacDonald, a Select Committee was named to investigate the question of 
employer liability. The Bill proposed to eliminate "common employment" as 
a defense against liability . The Committee's duty was to investigate 
whether an employer could be held liable for injuries his employees received 
when these injuries were the result of actions by the Managers and Foremen 
appointed by the employer. The Committee was also to investigate whether 
"common employment" could be defined by legislative enactment in a clearer 
way than it stood new before the law .1
A Select Committee is bi-partisan in nature, its role being investi­
gative not legislative. Findings from such a Committee are presented to 
Parliament in the form of a Report. There may be one report if the Commit­
tee agrees on the findings or there may be a majority report and one or more 
minority reports. The 1876 Committee would reach no conclusions and its 
investigations would be resumed in 1877. Several members sat on both the 
1876 and 1877 committees. Some of these were Robert Lowe, chairman, 
Alexander MacDonald, Sir Henry Jackson, George Shaw-Lefevre, Sir Daniel 
Goo chi, Robert Knowles, and Charles Tennant. This assorted group of Liberal 
and Tory part members initially sat from July 11, 1876 to July 21, 1876, 
hearing testimony dealing with employer liability and "common employment."
Among the Committee members, Lowe and MacDonald were the most stead­
fast in their desire to see something resolved on the problem of liability.
Sessional Papers, 1876, Vol. 9 - #372, p. 669.
16
17
Lowe had demanded that a Select Committee be named. A Liberal with a
3
"short tongue," he often made enemies of people who might have been friends.
But he was sincere in his desire to see the workman protected. His desire
was to "rectify the dictum, which judges had fabricated out of thin a ir ,
that when an employee took a job he contracted for the risk that his fellow
4
workmen might cause him injury." After 1880, when he sat in the House of 
Lords as Viscount Sherbrooke, he seldom intervened in debate except to talk 
about employer liability.
Alexander MacDonald was one of the first working-class members to sit 
in Parliament. A miner, whose father was also a miner, he had been elected 
to Parliament in 1874. As a miner, he understood perhaps better than anyone 
the need for remedy in the case of accidents on the job. After years of the 
National Minorus Conference, the Trades Union Congress, the Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants, and the Miners National Union instigating pos­
sible bills , labor had a member of its own and he sat on the Select 
Committee. Though he would be known as the M.P. who "grilled" the employer 
witnesses without mercy, the main source of his effectiveness lay "in his 
exact appreciation of the particular changes that would remedy the miners'
grievances, and in his tactical skill with which he embodied these changes
5
in legislative form."
2
James Winter, Robert Lowe (Toronto, 1925); p. 306.
Ruth Knight, Illiberal Liberal (London, 1966); p. 256.
Winter, p. 306.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London, 1920); 
p. 301.
18
All the witnesses heard between July 11 and July 21 fit into one of 
three groups: those of labor background who favored employers being liable!
the owners of the large industries who did not, and the legal experts who 
either did or did not favor liability, depending on hew they rationalized 
it. The main themes running through all the testimony were the question of 
consideration of risk or injury being a part of the wages paid, the question 
of agent responsibility and the debate as to whether employer liability 
would make workers more careless or more cautious.
George Howell, Parliamentary agent for the Trade Unions, felt the cen­
tral questions of liability was the "common employment" problem.*’ Used as a 
defense by employers, it prevented any sort of compensation to the injured 
employee. The injury was viewed as a risk of the job. In conjunction with 
this view, Henry Broadhurst, Secretary of the Trades Union Congress Parlia­
mentary Committee, explained that the argument of risk being a factor of 
wages was invalid. In his experience, an employee had to do the job he was
assigned, even if he was aware that it was dangerous, or risk losing his
7
job. Frederick Evans, General Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants, testified that the assertion that higher wages were paid 
in return for risk was false. The least experienced men, those new to the 
job, ran the greatest risk. The wage was a response to the experience of 
the employee, according to Evans, with higher wages used as recompense and 
as inducement to the senior employees.
Sessional Papers, 1876, Vol. 9 , p. 1. 
Ib id ., p. 64.
8
Ib id ., p. 67.
While the employers who testified had little to say about risk, the 
barristers spoke at great length* Accordingly, Barrister Courtenay Ilbert 
cited an 1867 decision, Wilson v. Merry, where the judge had ruled that 
common employment was not the issue. What was at issue was whether the dam-
9
age from the accident was within the risk factor of the job. But, accord­
ing to Ilbert, "For practical purposes a passenger by railway knows just as 
well as the workman can do, the dangers that are incurred in railway journ­
eys. The Queen's Counsel, Joseph Brown, was not so willing to concede 
on risk. His testimony was a re-affirmation that the employee took a 
necessary risk when getting hired for any job, a risk taken into considera­
tion by the payment of wages. ^  The apparent impasse of legal opinion was 
changed when four days after Brown's testimony; on July 18, Samuel Wright, 
barrister, noted that this type of consideration was a legal fiction. Apart 
from the more dangerous trades (and even these were only slightly affected)
" . . .t h e  rate of wagee is governed mainly by much more general circum- 
12
stances ..." Discomfort of the job was a more accurate wage determinant
according to Wright. Below ground mine work for example drew a higher wage
13
than such work on the surface.
It would seem then that the majority of those witnesses testifying 
disagreed with the notion of risk being considered as part of the wage.
9
Sessional Papers, 1876, Vol. 9 , p. 23.
20
Although the testimony of the Trade Union members was part self-
interested , the legal testimony stands on fairly firm ground. The risk
factor is an implied doctrine. Seemingly, "Volenti non fit  Injuria" would
be an appropriate expression of the risk factor. "No wrong arises to one
consenting" does deal with initial acceptance of the job and could deal even
implicitly with certain remunerations being the appropriate consideration 
14
of risk. The "Volenti" doctrine states that one accepting the conditions 
and duties entailed in the job can then lay no claim against the employer at 
some future point because of injury. Consideration of risk when applied 
to wages would signal that the "Volenti" doctrine was being adhered to. 
However, the doctrine negates the concept of responsibility in "Qui facit 
per alium r. :it per se ." Therefore the general testimony opposed to con­
sideration of risk is in agreement with the "Qui facit" standard.
Agent responsibiity can best be defined as the measure of responsi­
bility of the employer for the actions of his employees towards each other. 
This is very much the core of "common employment." As Howell explained, 
a man injured by a fellow employee was seen to be in "common employment"
with the latter. This man was judged an agent by the employer, who there-
15
fore owed no compensation to the injured man. Delegated authority was a 
very good measure of the employer's liability . If he delegated to another 
the task of supervision why should he then be held for the mistakes com­
mitted by the "vice-master" as it were. In response to the idea of the 
employee being able to caution a fellow worker who was in danger of injuring
14
Ruegg, p. 227.
15
Sessional Papers, 1676, Vol. 9 , p. 1.
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someone, Broadhurst explained that no worker had such authority: M. . . I
did not employ him ...and I cannot order him to change his co n d u c t ,"^
Futhermore, Broadhurst felt those with delegated authority such as foremen
were so anxious to please the employer that they skimped on quality and
17
quantity of materials used and hurried the workers in their jobs.
"Every act done for a corporate body...the law holds to be the act of 
16
a fellow servant." This bitter assessment by Evans stands in sharp con­
trast to that of the representative for the Builders' Society, Benjamin
Hannen. Hannen resented all forms of liability to the employer including
19
the liability to strangers injured through the acts of his employees.
Hannen felt that a law making the employer responsible for acts of his
employees which resulted in injury to other employees would "tend to prevent
our putting a foreman, who is a protection to the workers, on works where
20
at present we put him.
The barristers were again divided in their view as to agent respon­
sibility. Barrister Ilbert expressed the current status as an anomaly: 
whereas the general law made the master "liable to pay compensation for the
consequences of a wrongful act, neglect, or default of his servant while in
21
the course of his employment...," civil and criminal law excepted such
16
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liability where the servant injured a fellow servant. The reason for
this, according to Ilbert, was that if the employer did his best to employ
competent people, he could not be held responsible for their subsequent
actions. This reasoning dovetails with the idea that a servant should
always be watchful of fellow employees thus promoting the safety of the
whole group. Were a law passed on liability , Brown felt this duty of pru-
23
dence among workers would shift to the employer entirely. Wright, however,
pointed out that this type of prudence promoted immunity for the master to
the point where he would take care to not be directly involved in the job
24
and would always be able to affirm his due care in hiring his employees.
Based on this testimony, the concept of agent responsibility was 
viewed from quite different perspectives. Whereas the Trade Unions and 
certain barristers saw it as a legal excuse from compensation, the employers 
and Brown saw it as a necessary item which altruistically promoted safety 
among the workers. The dichotomy between these views was very central to 
the whole issue of liability. Unfortunately, this division tended to cloud 
up the important points about agent responsibility such as industry's 
growing distrust of the Trade Unions and the necessity for both sides to com­
promise. These problems coupled with most employers' abuse of the "common 
employment" thesis created side issues in the committee testimonies which 
in 1880 would unnecessarily prolong debate over employer liability.
Sessional Papers, 1876, Vol. 9 , p. 61.
Ib id ., p . 40.
24
Ib id ., p. 49.
The third issue invo ued worker safety. Th*5 unions ( tnd MacDonald)
adamentiy opposed any notions that an Employer Liability Act woulu encourage
workers to be more careless or at the least discourage them from being more
careful. In fact, Howell and MacDonald concurred on the idea that if an
employer were not liable for acts occur inq under his delegated authority,
there would be "less inducement. . .  for safety. . .  than were the employer him-
25
self superintending..." Broadhurst agreed with this when he noted how
26
reluctant employers were to let their employees use eve protection. They 
suggested that if the employer could be held accountable, the safety pro­
tections would be greatly encouraged. The Trade Union witnesses were not 
concerned about very minor injuries such as cuts and bruises. Their concern 
lay in the major accidents that either killed or severely impaired a worker.
Broadhurst suggested, in fact, that jury decisions could be used to deter-
27
mine the sc ^rity and compensatory status of an injury.
In response to Brawn's opinion that such an Act would make workers
less careful, MacDonald gave figures that showed 80% of all mine accidents,
one of the large industries, to have been the result of misconduct by the 
28
mine manager. Barrister Ilbert, in describing the Farwell case, noted 
that the U .S . judge ruled that employee double-checking "would more effec­
tually secure the safety of the employees than would a law holding the
Sessional Papers, 1876, Vol. 9 , p. 5.
Ib id ., p. 63.
Ib id ., p. 64.
Ib id ., p. 45 - This data wa . part of a yearly compilation of Coroner 
reports under the title: Reports of the Inspectors of Mines.
24
employer respor ible for employee a tion." Wright, however, seemed 
unimpressed by this reasoning. He concurred with MacDonald that passengers 
who were covered under the liability of the railway company owner, were not 
known to be especially reckless nor deliberately seeking injury for the sake 
of compensation. 30
Although there was no true consensus on this point of worker safety
in relation to a compensation law, the general feeling was that this area
at least was not a very important point. Consideration of risk and agent
responsibility were the central issues by the end of the Corwnittee hearings.
However, the Committee did not issue a Report but instead asked leave to
reconvene for further hearings in a future Session of Parliament.
When the Committee reconvened in 1677, three additional members were
added: Charles Hopwood, James Bulwer, and Henry Ripley. The Committee
sat from March 15, 1877 througi June 22, 1877. Their function was to con-
31
tinue the inquiry into employer liability and “common employment.1' Within
these two subjects lay the items of Benefit Funds, agent responsibility, and
job safety, the latter two carryovers from 1876.
The Benefit Societies were upheld by the owners as being the best way
to handle injuries. Alfred Hewlett, a Coal and Iron Master from Lancashire,
felt these were of more value to the employees and helped maintain the “bond
32
of union between employers and employed.“ John Simpson from Durham who
Sessional Papers, 1876, Vol. 9 , p. 21.
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Sessional Papers, 1877, Vol, 10 - #285 , p. i i . 
Ib id ., p. 43.
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co-cwned several collieries explained that his Benefit Society paid injured
33
men 6s per week in Durham and 5s per week in Northumberland. On closer
questioning, he divulged the fact that this Society was a Workers' Fund to
which the owners contributed only 20% of the total funds, the remainder
34
being contributed by the employees themselves. In fact, the majority of 
these Benefit Societies were largely employee-funded. Such was the case
with the West Yorkshire Miners' Association, funded entirely by the employees
35
who contributed Is per week to support it. Ironically, William Firth,
chairman of the West Yorkshire Iron and Coal Conpany, seemed to agree with
the fact that most Societies were employee-funded when he stated that the
Unions and Societies ought to be liable for the injuries as they had large
36
funds set aside for that purpose whereas the owners had no such funds.
A graphic example of the combined effects on the worker of agent 
responsibility and "worker responsibility" was explained by John Burnett, 
secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. A man operating a machine 
would have to replace a drive belt on it. The owners and managers, for the 
most part, preferred that the machine stay running so as to avoid a loss of 
production. If the employee injured himself while replacing the belt on the 
running machine, the employer would be excused of any liability on the 
grounds that the employee had no business replacing the belt in that fashion,
33
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and if he did so it was at his own risk. In the case where the manager or 
agent had told him to replace the belt, any claim that the agent was at
fault for unsafe practices (and thus the owner liable) was countered by the
37
fact that the manager was in "common employment" with the employee.
The question of agent responsibility was argued largely between owners 
and Trade Union officials in their respective testimonies. John Simpson, 
a colliery owner, felt that the owner did his best to provide the most
38
competent -magement and that having done so, his responsibility was over.
G. Fereday Smith, chairman of the Mining Association of Great Britain,
echoed this sentiment and added that enough responsibility was a ‘ ready
placed on employers. Speaking about collieries, he noted that owners were
limited in the hiring of managers. Only those men who passed a certain
39
examination (instituted by Parliament) could be hired as managers. His
contention was that the manager, in those businesses that used managers, was
liable for injuries. One witness for employers, William Cole, representing
the North of England United Coal Trade Association, did admit (under
MacDonald's questioning) that while the owners were willing to accord their
managers all the blame cf an injury, they seldom disciplined them, even in
40
cases cf gross negligence. In all the owners' testimony two conflicting 
assertions appeared again and again. While claiming that few injuries even 
resulted from the misconduct or negligence of a manager, the owners insisted
Sessional Papers, 1877, Vol. 10, p. 20.
Ib id ., p. 26.
39
Ib id ., p. 36.
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that were they to be held liable for the actions of their managers they
would soon be financially ruined.
The Trade Union and other labor witnesses were just as adament in
their stand for liability. Speaking on behalf of the Durham Miners, WilJiam
Crawford stated, “In common fairness and e q u it y ,. . .i f  the individual
employer is responsible for his own act, so the owner who delegates his
authority. . .ought to be responsible for the acts of all those that do wh
41
he himself would do if he did not so delegate his power.M Benjamin
Pickard of the West Yorkshire Miners' Association went so far as to contend
that even overtly negligent acts of a manager should be held against the
owner on the grounds that the owner hired the man and must therefore bear
42
the responsibility of that hiring. This was, of course, in direct contra­
diction to the owners' claim that liability ended for thj employer once the 
manager had been hired. In short, labor's stance was a re-affirmation of 
"Qui facit per alium facit per se ." As Crawford indicated, agent respon­
sibility for an injury should not prevent employer liability. The agent was 
acting for the employer and his actions, whether direct or indirect, were 
the actions of the employer had he been there.
Whether employees would be more or less careful were employer lia­
bility to become law had been d e b a te d  in 1876. At that time, it had not 
been judged a vital issue. The witnesses at the hearings this time seemed
Sessional Papers, 1877, Vol. 10, p. 33.
Ib id ., p. 1.
42
Ib id ., p 14.
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much more concerned about it* especially the Trade Unions. The employers
and owncra, as for example Simpson* felt it was the employee's duty to
complain to the owner about jab conditions. Simpson also stated that if the
43
complaint made was judged to be not valid, the employee should be fired. 
Francis Pearce, a Mining Engineer from Yorkshire, feared that if an Act on
44
liability were passed* it would “prevent provident habits amongst workmen."
MacDonald then asked whether such legislation would promote reckless activity
and if so had all past legislation protecting the workman promoted and
increased reckless activity. Pearce stated he had only been giving his
45
opinion, not stating statistical facts.
MacDonald had, early in the hearings, pointed out that the notion
that the 1872 Mines Act gave provisions for the worker to complain about
his supervisor was not correct. In fact, the provision (listed as the 30th
46
General Rule) was only for reporting on the condition of the mine.
Another delusion was that workmen were to supervise each other. Pickard
explained, "In fact, they have no privilege, or right, to say to a workman
that he is doing wrong at all. The rules says that he cannot go out of his
47
own working place." There was a penalty if the employee left his workspot
for any reason whatsoever, according to Pickard: a 40s fine or two months
48
imprisonment. There were other difficulties with fellow worker supervision.
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Henry Cook, Secretary for the Fife and Clackmannan Miners, stated that in
mining work most miners worked alone, at great distances from each or at
49
least too far away to actually supervise eich other. Cook also noted that
the employee who did go to a fellow worker to ask him to put his pipe or
who complained to the manager or cwner was soon fired due to being too
50
troublesome and meddling. As a result, "where a man’ s living is at stake,
51
it is difficult to speak out boldly.”
The legal question of wages contributing in part a payment for the 
risk of the job was debated mainly between the legal experts and the owners. 
Henry Briggs, a colliery cwner from Normanton, compared the wages of the
52
main r®am miners, 6s 4d per day, with those of the laborers, 3s 6d per day.
He concluded the risk of the job explained the wage differential though he
had to allow for the fact that the unpleasant nature of deep mining could
53
also account for the wage disparity. Railway owners and managers also
held to the risk and wage formula. James Greerson of the Great Western
Railway Company, stated that enginemen, who were the highest paid employees,
54
dictated their pay due to the risk of the job. Only one employer, George
49
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Findlav, in speaking of engin©man, admitted to other considerations: "They
55
are paid, no doubt, for their skill and knowledge in d r iv in g ..."
The legal testimonies of two Justices of Appeal, Sir George W. W. 
Bramwell and the Right Honorable Sir William Baliol Brett, demonstrate the 
range of legal disagreement on the risk and wage issue. Bramwell felt 
employees were rightly compensated if they worked in dangerous trades: the
5'
owner donated to an accident fund or he paid those employees a higher wage.
He further contended that there was no contract with the master to be indem-
57
nified. The only contract between the two was a wage in consideration for 
work performed and in consideration for risk. Brett agreed that risk was a 
consideration but he qualified the scope of the word. "I do not think that 
negligence is a thing to be contemplated as the ordinary result of employ­
ment . . .However if the case be that of lifting exceedingly heavy weights
which are liable to fall, notwithstanding care ...that I would call a risk of
58
the employment." The difference between the two Justices' views is one of 
degrees yet important. Where Bramwell would rule any accident a risk of the 
job, Brett would allow that negligence was not taken on as part of employ­
ment. Brett's reasoning for not allowing negligence as a risk was that 
negligence was already a criminal liability. To separate one section of 
negligence and make these non-criminal was, in his view, an abuse of Common 
Law. In the final analysis, however, neither justice was willing to
55
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eliminate risk as a wage consideration. Their opinion matched those of 
the employers.
The Report issued by the Committee on June 25, 1877 was a consensus 
Report with no minority Reports given. In reaching their conclusions they 
relied on the Farwell decision regarding employees checking each other.
The Report, quoting from that decision, read in part:
. . .where several persons are employed in the 
conduct of one common enterprise or undertaking, 
and the safety of each depends much upon the care 
and skill with which each other shall perform 
his appropriate duty, each is an observer of 
the conduct of the other, can give notice of 
any m is c o n d u c t a n d  leave the service if
59
the common employer will not take precautions...
In discussion of employer responsibility the Committee found:
The true principle of law is that no man is
responsible except for his own acts and
defaults, and the rule relied upon is itself not
a rule but an exception, which the Courts have
60
explained and confined within proper limits.
Therefore:
No case is made out for any alteration in
the law relating to the liability of
employers to their workmen for injury in
61
the course of their employment...
^  Sessional Papers, 1877, Vol. 10, p. ii (Report).
60 Ib id ., p. iv (Report).
61
Ib id ., p. v (Report).
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The Report allowed for alterations only in three specific cases. These 
were: where poor materials were provided, where negligence could be shown
in the choice of persons to supply such materials, or where negligence was
62
demonstrated in the selection of proper workmen. The issues of Benefit
Societies, consideration of risk in the wages paid, and agent responsi~ 
bility were not mentioned in the Report.
The Report to the House of Commons relied on the notion of employees 
being able to check on each other, despite labor testimony to the contrary 
and complicated the question of who was employer, agent, or employee with
the vague definition of the Parwell decision used as definition: "...sev-
63
eral persons employed in ...o n e  common enterprise."  Therefore, all the
original issues before the Committee since its inception in 1876 remained
unresolved. "Common employment", employee-checking, agent responsibility,
consideration of risk in wages, and Benefit Societies were still undefined,
subject to personal bias and varied interpretations. The Committee did only
64
come to one firm resolve: "common employment” should not be eliminated.
The unresolved areas surrounding employer liability were left to the House 
to decide on in 1880.
62
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CHAPTER 4 - 1880 EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
The significance and purpose of the Select Committee Hearings of 1876 
and 1877 were demonstrated in 1879 when Disraeli's  Government was presented 
with a bill proposed by Libral M .P .'s  MacDonald and Burt. This bill gave 
right of action (right to sue) to an injured employee whether the accident 
resulted from defective machinery, supervisory error, the error of another 
employee, or any other reason except intentional self-injury. The bill thus 
put the employee on an equal footing with a stranger. A later bill written 
by the Government also gave right of action but only in the case where the 
injury was the result of supervisory negligence. Both b ills , however, were 
dropped before they reached Second Reading.
On February 6 , 1880, MacDonald, not giving up on the issue, despite
the result of the Bills of 1879, proposed a replica of his earlier b ill .
It was read both a first and second time.^ However, Disraeli called for a
general election at this point. Liberal leader Gladstone was called to
set up the new government and ail pending legislation was halted. But,
MacDonald, ever persistent, wasted no time in proposing a new bill when
Parliament reconvened. This time, though, the Government also proposed
legislation. On May 21, 1880, scarcely a month after the Liberals had come 
2
to power, Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Henry James, John Dodson (all members of 
the Ministry), and Thomas Brassey brought into the House of Commons an
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 251  - 2/6/80 and 4 /21 /80 . 
They came to power on 4 /29 /80 .
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an Employer Liability Bill for a First Reading. MacDonald's Bill, which was 
read the same day, would soon be dropped in favor of the Government proposal.
The Bill proposed by the Government was, as the 1879 proposals had 
been, a move by Government to permit an injured employee legal action.
The provisions applied in the cases of defective works or machinery, negli­
gent superintendence, or acts or omissions of fellow workers if they had
4
been acting under the instructions of the employer or his supervisor.
The injured worker was to have the "same right of compensation and emedies 
against the employer as if he had not been a workman of the employer.' The 
limit of recovery was set at L200 and the action to be within county juris­
diction. In this initial stage, the Bill appeared reasonable, straight­
forward, and in need of little improvement.
Dodson, who presented the Bill at Second Reading on June 3, 1880, 
gave a lengthy speech explaining the reasons for proposing such legisla­
tion. Two points of his speech were especially relevant. First, the 
employee was denied compensation on the grounds that he had the opportunity 
to know his fellew worker and of judging this worker capable or not. Sec­
ondly, by accepting employment, he accepted the risks incident upon such 
employment.^ Thus two items widely debated in 1876 and 1877 were now 
acknowledged to be unreasonable. For in the words of Lord Deas, "If the
7
maxim, Culpa tenet sups autores, were held to be the general rule in *45
3
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5 Ibid.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 252 - 6 /30 /80 , c. 1084.
 ^ Misconduct (negligence) binds (should bind) its own authors.
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questions of liability fo afault or negligence, the law would be consis­
tent and of easy application. But when that maxim is applied exceptionally 
to relieve a master from liability to his servants for the fault or negli­
gence of a fellow-servant, it does not sufficiently justify this exception 
simply to say that a servant undertakes all the risks incident to hi s con-
g
tract of service." Dodson also emphasized that the purpose of the pro­
posed Bill was to restrict the defense of "common employment" a».d to revert
the legal understanding of this are- to pre 1837 (Priestley decision)
9
status.
This legislation was not only a matter of a government bill being
brought in to strengthen Gladstone though there were some who felt this
1 0
issue to be important to his continued strength. There were several con­
crete events as well that pushed the concept of Employer Liability to the 
front. An 1877 Royal Commission Report had shown that in 1875 a total of 
4,385 accidents affectiayf either life or limb had occurred to rail servants. 
Of these, 514 injuries and 39 deaths had been due to negligence and beyond
the control of the servants involved. ^  Also, an 1879 explosion at the
12
Blantyre Colliery in Lancashire left 28 men dead. In fact, a Mine 
Inspector's Report of that year showed 973 fatalities in all mining
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 255, c. 1964.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 252, c. 1087.
For exampJe, John Gorst expressed his belief that this matter had been an 
election issue. (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 252 - 6/30 /80 , c. 1144)
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 255 - 8 /24 /80 , c. 1965.
12
Sessional Papers, Vol. 15, 1880, p. 819.
36
accidents of Great B r it a in .^  This came to an average of one person killed
14
out of every 490 employed.
Perhaps the biggest factor in bringing about this attempt at chance
was the fact that both Germany and Franoe had laws governing employer
liability. Reports made to the Comn.ons showed that Germany protected all
rail workers from negligent accidents or deaths unless they were found to
15
be seIf-caused. Also, German miners were protected from injuries result­
ing from supervisory orders. Their law meant that most German workers 
could bring suit against the employer and if , as in the case of miners, 
the worker was protected by a Friendly Society, the judge subtracted the 
amount of insurance provision from the damage award for which the employer 
was liable. The Report went on to state that, as a result of this law 
(passed in 1872), most owners in German businesses undertook to insure their 
workers.^
France had similar laws and at the time of the Report to the Commons
had proposed an extremely simple clause:
Whenever a man, hiring his labor to another man, is 
wounded or killed in his service, the employer shall 
be entirely responsible, unless he can prove that 
the accident is the result of the acts of the v ic tim .^
13
14
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This would be the entire French statute on employer liability . It would
make the employer responsible for any injury on or about his workplace and
put the onus of proof of innocence cn the owner. The rationale of the
French proposal, according to the Report, was that with machinery and steam
entering the industries, the employee was no longer an individual craftsman
but an automaton. Therefore, injuries could be caused by this machinery
(interpreting machinery in the broadest sense possible) and since the owner
18
had brought in these machines, he was responsible for the consequences.
In his speech, Dodson acknowledged that the cost of this type of leg­
islation might be increased litigation. However, he felt that in the long 
run litigation would decrease, that the capitialist would net run frem Great 
Britain, and that British industries would not suffer in foreign trade 
because most of Europe already had this type of law and were, therefore, 
already paying for it in higher prices. His final point was a reminder to 
the House that many workers were at present receiving compensation from 
their employers and that the significance of this law would be to give the 
employees a legal claim in addition to their current dependence on their 
employers' bounty.
The June 3 debate prior to Second Reading centered not on the Bill 
itself but on technical matters designed, it would seem, to halt or at 
least slew the progress of the B ill. One such argument was that a Select 
Committee should be appointed to examine the question of employer liability. 
Noting that two previous Select Committees had examined this issue (1876
18
Sessional Papers, Vol. 59, 1880 - Commercial Report #29.
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and 1877)4 Attorney General Sir Henry James asserted there was no need for
19
such an investigation as all questions had been answered in 1877. Other
members opposed the reading of the Bill until it had been amended by the
Cabinet. The reason for this is less obvious. A Second Reading of a Bill
was in essence an affirmation of the principle of the B ill. This is what
the Government sought and what the Opposition Conservatives did not wish
to give them. In the end, the Bill was read for the second time, was
passed 261 to 132 by a division vote, and committed for consideration in
committee. Sir Henry Jackson’s warning that this Bill would "produce an
economical revolution, of which the House did not appreciate the effect 
20
or the danger" echoed in the House chamber after the Reading.
The committee consideration*  took place in June 4 , 1880, and the Bill 
was then scheduled for full House debate in July. The "re-committed debate" 
began on July 2 and brought out three points of view, each represented by 
an M .P .: MacDonald wanted the Bill to cover all injuries and felt that
abolishment of the "common employment" defense was the only means to make
21
the employer completely liable. Arthur Balfour represented the view of
those who sought to diminish employer liability to only those accidents in
22
which the employer was directly involved. Sir Henry Jackson concurred
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with Balfour when he called the present law one of “natural justice .'1
However, if there was to be a liability law, he insisted a limit be placed
on monetary awards and wished to provide for contracting-out of the law if
24
both employer and employee entered into an insurance agreement. In fact, 
the Attorney General had previously intimated that contracting-out would be
i i 25legal.
23
The "re-committed" debate, in addition to the three above-mentioned
views, brought out numerous objections to the B ill. John Knowles saw no
point to a bill which covered only 5% of all accidents while creating
26
unneeded tension between employer and employee. He felt the liability
would also depreciate the value of coal and iron properties in Great Britain
27
and thus be unjust to the investors in those industries. Even one of the
authors of the B ill, Chamberlain, acknowledged that in such industries as
mining and railways, the high nunber of accidents could potentially cripple
28
these industries with indemnity payments. At the center of these objec­
tions was the fear (recognized by the Government) of increased litigation 
and the ensuing effect of it.
However, as Leonard Courtney pointed out, the real issue before the 
House of Commons was "not the denial of liability on the part of the
23
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employer» but the limitation of his responsibility and how that limitation
29
was to be practically applied." This is the really crucial element of 
the 1880 debates. Because of those reasons enumerated above, because of the 
growing population of workers in high risk jobs, because of the growth of 
trade unionism; for these and other reasons, employer liability was here 
and it was now to be a fact. With this fact the House of Commons and all 
of Great Britain had to deal.
The question of social responsibility was at stake. As Thomas Burt 
insisted:
It is surely just as fair that the employer 
should be liable for such lax discipline as 
that which allowed men to go into dangerous 
mines with matches as that the workmen, gen­
erally, who have committed no fault should 
suffer injury without the chance of rocover- 
ing compensation. 30
The fear of litigation notwithstanding, this issue of responsibility was 
at stake. Government employees and their coverage are good examples of 
this growing liability.
As things stood before the passage of this Bill and even afterwards, 
Government workers had no right to sue for liability. The reason for this 
was that in order to sue, such a worker would have to sue the Crown. How­
ever , a legal maxim of ancient precedent stated that no subject could pro-
31
ceed against the Crown. The day would come though when this maxim was
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 252, c . 1141.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol, 255, c . 247.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 253 - Question on 6 /18 /80 , c . 295.
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swept aside. It was not done in revolt but in the expansion of social lia­
bility . The 1880 Act was only the first attempt at stretching the limits.
The Third Reading of the Bill took place on August 18, 188C. The 
major change agreed to in the course of the debate was in the limit on 
compensation allowable. It was no longer to be L200 but rather a sun
equivalent to "the estimated three year earnings of a person in the same
32
grade! in similar employment and of the same district." The Bill also 
added a definition of the concept of a supervisor: one whose duty lay in
carrying out the employer's orders and who did not normally engage in manual
33
labor.
The Debate at Third Reading did mention Government employees' cov­
erage under the act: John Gorst asked whether the Government was above the
34
law in not being liable for compensation. While this may not have been
35
s stalling tactic to defeat the Bill! Gorst had no position to argue from 
as this issue had been debated end defeated in Committee debate. Henry 
Broadhurst bent expressed the feelings of the House when he said that 
though the Bill was not perfect, it was a great improvement over what then
existed and should be accepted at this time with the realizatirn that
3o
further improvements could always be made.
While the Houue of Commons had not debated to any length the con­
cepts of risk and fellow-worker caret the House of Lords seemed only too
Sessional Papers! Vol. 3 , 1880 - Bill #311, p. 2.
33 Ib id ., p. 4.
34
Parliamentary Debates! Vol. 255, c. 1478.
35
As Charles Bradlaugh asserted (Parliamentary Debates! Vol. 255, c. 1432). 
^  Parliamentary Debates! Vol. 255, c. 1488.
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willing to do so. Lord Chancellor Selbourne attacked the concept of wagee
being a consideration of risk as being invalid. The wage was subject to the
supply and demand of the workforce and that of the commodity being manu-
37
factured. There was no premium for risk, he contended. That there was a
contract betareen master and servant which included this risk was in his
38
eyes also incorrect. The common law acknowledged that a master could now
be liable for his own negligence, yet no contract provided for that. The
risk of injury from a fellow-worker was likewise invalid then; for if the
master was liable without contract for his own negligence, no contract
39
was needed to make actions of his agents his liability .
The House of Lords recognized the limitations of the B ill. It was
experimental: increased litigation, growing disharmony between employer
and employee, and rises in prices of goods were but three of the potential
effects of the B ill . Yet, it hsd to be tried ard it had to be tried for a
sufficient length of time so that all the implications of liability could
be fully judged. Thus, the attempt by the Earl of Beaconsfield (Benjamin
Disraeli) to amend the Bill and limit its duration to two years was
overruled by the Commons when the Bill was returned to that House for
40
consideration of the Lords' Amendments.
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Ib id ., c . 1963.
Ib id ., c . 1963.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 256, c . 55; c. 1109.
43
When Royal Assent to the Bill was given on September 7, 1880, all
aides seemed reconciled to the concept. The Times while predicting that
the new liabilities would be considered in the wages, admitted that the Act
would "entail on the employer no further liability than that which he has
42
always been morally, although not legally, subject t o . . . "  Had Great 
Britain accepted this truly? The basic fact was that in the realm of neg­
ligence, an exception to the rule had been applied toward employees. This 
Act was to correct that exception and revive the maxim "Qui facit per alium 
facit per se ." There was now legal action maintainable and the case was 
closed.
Not exactly. Henry Broadhurst had spoken of this Act as being more
43
of a beginning, a means, rather than on end in itself. Indeed there
were several loose ends. The Act covered only a few classes of workers:
Railway workers, labourers, miners, journeymen, and craftsmen. It  did not
include domestic servants, menial servants, seamen, or servants of the 
44
Crown. Seamen were covered under other acts and it has been explained 
above why Government workers were not included. As to the servant class, 
only a very general guess can be made: they were perhaps not strong enough
politically to push for coverage and since servants wei.e generally regarded
41
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as part of the family they worked for, to cover them would involve too much 
government interference.
Also, the problems inherent in "common employment" had not been 
resolved. This Act carried liability to the employer only for those acts 
which he himself caused and these of the agents he had assigned authority 
to. There was no solution made of the "fellow-worker check up" problem 
which had been debated in 1876 and 1877. Furthermore, by not defining 
"coninon employment" in the Act, Parliament served only to cloud its defini­
tion and unintentionally expand it. The vital issue at the center of 
employer liability , the initial reason into the inquiries, had been passed 
over.
Another problem resulted from the language of the Act. There was no 
provision which made liability mandatory on the employer. Therefore, there 
was no legal reason preventing the employer from "contracting-out" of the 
law. Contracting-out would merely involve a simple agreement between 
employer and employee whereby the latter waived his right to court action.
As The Timea wrote, " . . . i t  will be the first thought of every la rg e ...
employer of labour to go to his solicitor and to instruct him to prepare ..."
45
such a form. A case arose in 1882 over this problem.
46
In Griffithr vs. Earl of Dudley, the facts were as follows. The 
employer, Lord Dudley, had continued a matching fund system for employees 
after passage of the 1880 Act. A condition of employment was agreement to 
contribute to the fund. Griffiths, who had agreed to contribute, was killed
London Times leader: 8 /4 /8 0 , p. 11, c . 3.
Law Times, Vol. 47 - 1882 Queen's Bench pp. 10-19.
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due to supervisory negligence. The accident falling under the 1880 Act,
his widow was awarded L150 in a lower Court. On appeal to the Queen's Bench,
Justices Field and Cave ruled that the condition of employment was legal
and reasonable and not contrary to the object and intent of the 1880 Act.
Therefore, as the deceased would have been barred from action against the
employer, so must his widow due to the nature of the contract which
47
Griffiths agreed to when hired.
A final problem to which this Act had not been directed lay in the 
realm of sub-contracting. Apparently, the practice of an employer to sub­
contract some of his work to another company was becoming more and more 
common. The sub-contractor was often a man of small financial means who
48
would not be likely to be able to provide compensation to his employees.
So, should the main employer be held responsible and, if so, on what legel 
justification? On the other hand, why should a certain class of workers 
run the risk of not being covered while they worked alongside workers who 
were covered. This problem was to grow in the years between 1880 and 1897 
until in that year it would be addressed.
These lingering difficulties shculd not mask the implications of the 
1880 Act. This was for Great Britain a definite step down the road of 
Workmen's Compensation. The Act did more than give legal right to sue. 
Implicit in the language was the realization that an employer did owe a 
certain responsibility to his employees. There was now a dual role in 
employee-employer relations. The first was that a certain wage was to bo
Law Times, Vol. 47 - 1882 Queen's Bench pp. 11-12. 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 255, c . 1495.
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earner! for performance of a duty. This had been, previous to 1880, the 
only relationship between master and servant.
Now, there was a new role which was almost an extension of the first: 
if the employee, in performance of a duty assigned to him, was injured, the 
employer was to acknowledge his role in the incident and compensate accord­
in g )/. That the Act was restricted in certain ways did not lessen the 
responsibility or obviate its significance. The employer was no longer 
immune. Just as an employee might have to forego wages if a job was per­
formed poorly, so too now, the employer would suffer a monetary loss if his 
instructions or materials were inferior. A1 chough this Act had not been 
the first self-questioning that Great Britain had done in regard to lia- 
ability, this Act was the first concrete evidence that the questioning had 
begun to be answered.
CHAPTER 5 - 1897 WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION iCT
The years between the 1880 Act and 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act 
saw a steady flow of claims brought to the courts. While the three year 
period of 1881 through 1883 brought 443 cases, claiming L 73,337 and being
awarded L18,124 ,* a later three year span (1888 through 1890) showed 507
2
cases brought asking for L80,880 and awarded L24,319. The average award
3
In those two periods went from L40.91 to L48. The final three years before 
the 1897 Act (1894-1896) showed: 702 cases, claiming L100,177 and awarded
4
L32,761 for an average award of L47. The average awards are too close 
perhaps to be of real significance. However) the increase in the number of 
cases is important. The first two three-year spans showed an increase in 
caseloads of 13%. Between the years 1888-1890 and 1894-1896) the increase 
was 28%. The 1880 Act had) it would seem, increased litigation in this 
area. This is especially important in view of the fact that The Times in 
November of 1881 had reported a total case load of 13 claims since the 1880
5
Act had gone into effect in January of that year!
Unless the British Government wished for continually growing numbers 
of suits, compensation would have to be settled out of court in a manner 
so that the need for court would be superfluous. One method, of course,
Sessional Papers, 1884, Vol. 63 - Report #63.
Sessional Papers, 1892, Vol. 72 - Report #357.
Ib id ., both Reports #63 and #357.
Sessional Papers, 1895, Vol. 8\ - Report #301. 
Ib id ., 1897, Vol. 73 - Report #352.
London Times - 11/25/81 - p. 9 , c. 5.
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since the Griffith decision, would simply be to encourage contracting- 
out. However, the mood of the people of Great Britain had changed over the 
years and they had come to see compensation as a right. No longer would 
Parliament debate whether or not an employer should be liable. As Leonard 
Courtney had pointed out in 1800, the question at hand was the regulation 
of compensatory laws. Precisely because the 1880 Act did not recognize 
this claim to compensation as a matter of course, the law would be altered.
In the 1893-1894 Parliamentary session, the Liberal Government had 
attempted to pass such legislation. The B ill , taking up where the 1880 
Act had left off, would have covered all grades of workers and would have 
abolished the concept of "common employment.M However, when the Bill had 
gone to the House of Lords, an amendment had been added which allowed for 
contracting-out. The Commons being unable to override this Amendment, on 
February 20, 1894, Prime Minister Gladstone moved to discharge the Bill, a 
step that in effect killed it .^  Curiously, the Conservative Opposition, 
while disparaging the Liberal Government for this move, did nothing to try 
and amend the Amendment or to try and override the discharge vote which was 
carried 2 25 to 6 .^
After that fiasco, no further move was made by the Government until 
1897 when a Liberal-Conservative-led House of Commons once again began 
debating a Liability Bill. The first question to deal with is whether this 
Bill was in accord with current conservative principles. Bearing in mind 
that the 1880 Act had been passed under a Liberal government and that the
Parliamentary Debate, 1894, Vol. 21, c. L51-899.
7
Ib id ., c. 899.
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1893-94 attempt had also been a Liberal government B ill , the immediate 
answer would appear to be no. However, the 1880 Act had been brought about 
due to the persistence of Alexander MacDonald, a Liberal of working class 
origin. Another M .P ., Thomas Burt, also from the working class, had played 
a role in the 1893-94 Bill. Albeit the M .P .'s  of working class origin were
g
few in number (in 1885, 11 such M .P .’s sat ), but right up through the 1897 
debates two powerful figures sat in Parliament: Burt and Henry Broadhurst.
This does not mean that these two men could carry Parliament but rather that 
their influence was such that they would certainly promote a Compensation 
B ill .
Significant in promoting interest in the subject were not only these 
two men but also concern with the issues already mentioned: increased
litigation, the shadow of the 1893-94 B ill , and widespread acknowledgement 
that a remedy was needed. In addition, several problems of the 1880 Act 
needed to be dealt with. ’’Common employment", contracting-out, which 
industries to make liable for work-related injuries, and prevention of 
accidents were but a few. Therefore, though at first glance, this Bill 
would seem anything but germaine to a Coalition Government, it was in fact 
a natural occurence. That the Conservatives happened to be in partial powtj 
was not an especially alarming phenomenum. For by this time, unlike past 
years, they wouJi no longer appear to be the last people on earth to propose 
such legislation. If anything, the fact that Salisbury's Cabinet proposed 
it can be accredited to the general acceptance of the principle of liability 
by Liberals and Conservatives alike.
8
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, op. c it . ,  p. 680.
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Early in 1897! a Bill was introduced to amend the 1800 Act. Authors
of the Bill were Burt, John Burns, Arthur O'Connor, David Randell, Charles
9
Fenwick and Sir Charles Dilke. This Bill and three similar Bills intro­
duced between January and May of 1897 did not get pant First Reading. What 
they did do though was to force the Government's hand who, though they 
accepted the principle of liability , were perhaps not so ready to practice
it. In any case on May 3 , Home Secretary Sir Matthew Ridley asked the House
10
of Commons for "leave to introduce the B ill ."
Several points of Ridley's speech are worth noting. He readily
acknowledged that past debr.be and problems were now forcing the Government
to make a move.1* However, the proposed "...schem e of general compensation,
under proper safeguards and necessary limitations. . .does not explicitly or
12
directly deal at all with the Acc of 1880." In other words, the Govern­
ment was not going to get embroiled (as perhaps the previous Government had) 
in a debate over the 1880 Act. Did this signify a departure from the intent 
of 1880? Ridley '8 own words best describe exactly what the Bill would do:
When a person on his own responsibility and for 
his own profit, sets in motion agencies which 
create risks for others, he ought to be civilly
13
responsible for the consequences of what he does.
9
10 
11 
12 
13
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In expanding on his explanation of what the Bill proposed to do,
Ridley explained that only the five most dangerous trades would be covered. 
These were mining, quarrying, engineering, railway work, and factory work.14 
Furthermore, the cost of the proposed Bill was to be bom  entirely by those 
trades. The reasoning behind this, according to Ridley, was that this was
not a scheme of general insurance but rather a statute forcing the employer
15
to become his own insurer. A fined point was that this Government Bill 
would no longer allow contributory negligence to be regarded as a defense 
against compensation.
Alexander Ure, in giving his approval of the B ill, laid out three 
items that were needed for a good liability b ill : it had to minimize the
risks of accidents to workmen; it had to minimize the hardships if an acci­
dent did occur; finally it had to minimize the friction between employer and
17
employee. The Bill would accomplish the first point in part because 
criminal litigation was still available to the employee under the 1880 Act. 
Hardship was lessened because a larger number of workers were absolutely 
covered and the compensation was increased. Lastly, friction was lessened 
because litigation with its attendant risks and uncertainties was no longer 
the only method of recovery. Additional factors of importance were brought 
out first by Arthur Forwood, who pointed out that an estimated 1% of total
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 48, c. 1421.
15 Ib id ., c. 1430-1431.
16 Ib id ., c. 1433.
17
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wages paid would go towards covering injuries, a sum which in his opinion
18
"would not be an onerous charge on the ind.u tries of the country."
Joseph Chamberlaini who had co-authored the Bill* explained that the 
abolishment of contributory negligence as an excuse to avoid paying compen­
sation had been done with the goal of minimizing litigation and restoring
19
a healthier labor-management atmosphere. At the heart of the proposed 
Bill was the "principle of relieving the workman while not punishing the 
employer."
However! even though all this discussion was taking place before the
contents of the Bill were even known! there were those in the Commons who
didn 't hesitate to voice their dissapproval of it . Herbert Asquith, leading
Member of the Opposition, objected to the fact that seamen and farm laborers
21
were excluded from the B ill. He also took issue with the fact that the
Bill did not abolish "common employment" and that accident prevention was
22
not specifically dealt with in the B ill. Sir Charles Dilke objected 
to the fact that the Government would be regulating plant conditions and 
that an insurance company would be paying the compensation. He preferred
these two matters be under trade jurisdiction and therefore be a trade
23
respons ib i1i ty.
18
19
20 
21 
22
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Perhaps some of the strongest opposition to the Bill came from 
Geoffrey Drage of Derby. He pointed out that similar legislation in Germany 
had served only to increase the carelessness of the employees while the 
price for the coverage was paid by the workers themrelves in lower wages. 
Employersi because of the cost of insurance , were less willing to contribute 
to charitie while the expense of such charities were rising. The small 
employer was being squeezed due to these costs and ill-feeling was on the 
rise among employers and employees. Finally, the act of labeling a man a 
"workman" was preventing his chances of advancement from such a position 
into a supervisory one. Thesei he emphasized, were the results of similar 
laws in Germany and would be the result in Great Britain were such a Bill to 
become law. **
The provisions of the Bill itself (the first Bill as presented for
First Reading) were remarkably "modem" -nd fairly reasonable and most
25
importantly, diverged sharply from the principle of the 1880 Act. Cov­
erage was for any injury or death except for those in which ir . recitation 
was less than two weeks in duration. Those covered were, as mentioned 
above, railway, factory, mine, quarry, and engineering (construction) 
workers, either employed in private or Governmental jobs. Death compensa­
tion was to be based on three years wages, neither below L I50 nor above 
L300. Injury compensation was 50% of the weekly wage, not to exceed Ll. 
Contracting-out was allowable if the scheme was equal to or better than the 
provisions of the B.vll, provided the scheme was already in existence. Any
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 48, c. 1456 (this includes all data presented 
in this paragraph).
Sessional Papers, 1897, Vol. 7 - Bill #213 (this includes all data pre­
sented in this paragraph).
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new scheme had to be certified and if the certification was ever revoked * 
the employee was automatically covered under the provisions of the Bill. 
Claim settlements were to be decided either by an Employer/Employee Com­
mittee or by arbitrationi such arbitrator selected by the Committee or in 
absence of a Committee! the County Court Judge would act as arbitrator or 
the Lord Chancellor could elect to have the local judge appoint an 
arbitrator.
Two trades were not covered. One! the shipping trades ( i .e a| seamen)
26
were already covered under existing legislation. Agricultural laborers
were also not covered. The basic reason for this omission! according to
Chamberlain! was that the laborers had made no demands for compensation 
27
coverage. Other factors could possibly have been that these laborers 
were less in touch with politics! had no strong trade unions to support 
them, and worked by and large on smaller family-type farms. However, the 
laborers would give voice to their demands in the not t fx> distant future.
Debate continued after the presentation of the Bill on May 3, 1897. 
There was concern over what percentage of workers would be covered. Accord­
ing to Ridley, of Great Britain's total worker population of 13 million,
28
only 6 million of these worked in the industries covered in the Bill.
This proportion did not change during the many debates and hearings in the 
following months. Despite Asquith's displeasure with this fact (which he
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 48, c. 1466. 
Ib id ., c. 1466.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 49, c. 697.
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spoke of in July ), the reasoning of the Government on this issue cannot 
be dismissed. The more dangerous trades were to be covered: those where
accidents and fatalities had become almost regular occurrences. Further­
more, this Bill was viewed by the Government as not so much a hard and 
fast principle but as an experiment and as a means of opening the way 
towards total liability . Salisbury's Cabinet realized that to try to extend 
this novel idea to all trades would only result in failure of the Bill 
because there was still enough Conservative ill-feeling towards it and the 
Liberal party would be of little help. The Government, therefore, compro­
mised on this issue of coverage, sensing perhaps that broader coverage 
would come about although not at this point. In this sense, no amount of 
complaints from Asquith and other Liberals can deny the fact that the 
Government moved wisely.
The question of insurance was also an emotional item. Some, such as
Sir Edward H ill, felt that insurance should be made compulsory for all
30
employers regarding their workers. This would resolve the question of 
liability and that of litigation by removing the coverage to an outside 
agency. This was a fairly shocking proposition in 1897 because it would 
change what had begun as Preventive Legislation into Compensative Legisla­
tion. Even more shocking and with a distinct 20th Century ring was a pro­
posal by Llewellyn Atherley-Jones, that in cases where the employer was 
insolvent and unable to pay the liability , it should be the Government's
29
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responsibility to secure the workman’s compensation. While neither of 
these gentlemen's proposals were accepted, their ideas, like the debate as 
to which workers were covered, wera not forgotten and would be brought up 
in 1906.
The importance of the B ill 's  contents were not forgotten in this 
Second Reading debate. As Robert Ashcroft pointed out, this Bill would 
terminate several common defenses used by employers when confronted with 
injury claims. Among these the most common excuse was that of defective
notice. Notification was regulated under the 1880 Act by means of a certain 
set of words being needed to notify of injury. Failure to use this formula 
resulted in non-suit being found in court. When the 1897 Act removed the 
Court as the focus of determining liability and made certain industries 
always liable, this exact language was no longer immediately necessary to 
warrant notice. If the employee left his employer a short note saying he'd 
been injured he would later be allowed to fill out the correct form for 
injuries.
Other excuses which were no longer feasable under the 1897 Act were 
those such as the employee knowing of the defect beforehand and not report­
ing it, injury due to a fellow workman, injury caused by supervisory orders 
being disregarded, injuries being less severe than represented, and the 
excuse that the machinery causing the injury was not defective as claimed. 
The Bill eliminated these excuses because blanket-coverage for work-related 
injuries was the purpose of the 1897 Act.
31
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As the Bill moved through Committee hearings, two major items of
debate arose. The first of these was the all-too familiar question of
contracting-out. The Bill had allowed for contracting-out if the scheme
was equal to or better than the B ill 's  provisions. Now several amendments
were added. The first was to clarify the conditions of contracting-out,
making it illegal for the employer to guarantee employment only if the
33
employee would contract out of the terms of the Bill. A second change
provided that any contracts existing at the commencement of the Act were
automatically invalid. Provisions were made to clarify the revocation of
the certificate of any Friendly Society or other outside benefit agent.
Revocation was immediate if the provisions were being violated by the
34
employer or if the provisions were not being administered equitably.
Two final provisions were that any contracting-out could only be done
through the Registrar of Friendly Societies who would oversee certification
35
(each certification to be for a 5-year period ' ) and that if the funds for
3
a scheme were insufficient, the employer would be liable for the difference.
The second item was subcontracting. Subcontracting was becoming 
more and more noticeable and the test of what was a valid sub-contract was 
perhaps best expressed by Ruegg: "If the person entering into such contracts
retains the rights of employer over the men engaged in carrying out the work, *3
33 Sessional Pap3rs, 1897 , Vol. 7 - Bill #287 ^ 1 ( 4 ) .
34 Ibid.
3  ^ Sessional Papers, 1897, Vol. 7 - Bill #312 ^ 3 ( 1 ) .  
36 Ib id ., 3 (3 ).
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he must retain as well the responsibilities of employer." In the
Committee hearings of 1897, the Bill was amended to make the employer the
liable party whether to direct employees or subcontracted ones, providing
38
that the work being done was in direct relation to the operations.
Recourse for the employer regarding the subcontracted employees was by court
39
action against the employer of those employees. Injury in subcontracting
work indirectly related to the operations was to be the responsibility of
40
the subcontracting employer. However, a later amendment during the
Committee debates removed this distinction between direct and indirect work,
making the main employer liable for all injuries with recourse against the
41
subcontracting employer in court.
These changes, along with an amendment disallowing compensation in
the case of willful negligence on the part of the injured worker and
another amendment changing the weekly compensation from 50% of the weekly
earnings to 50% of the average weekly earnings of the past twelve months or
42
average earnings in the period employed if less than twelve months, 
brought the Bill into the House to Third Reading on July 15. The main 
points of disagreement now lay in two areas: the Bill was seen as the
37
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beginning of Socialism and it w*«* iudged by some to be an interference with 
freedom of contract, imposing a legal obligation where no moral one 
existed .4'*
On the issue of Socialism, Broadhurst remarked: "[We] cannot resist
the tendency of the day, which [is] to make the State satisfy the just
44
claims that the poor [have] upon the S t a t e ..."  In other words, State
responsibility was to become a fact of British life . Whether one chose to
call it Socialism or not did not change the fact that state intervention
had become necessary. The "tendency of the day" would in short become the
certainty of the day. Broadhurst saw this as a natural progression.
The objections regarding freedom of contract and legal obligation
were best rejected by Chamberlain when he said:
When you enter upon a business you must consider
this compensation is as much a trade charge as is
new the provision which you are called upon to
make for the repair of machinery. You at present
have to put aside every year a certain sum for the
repair of the inert machinery, which is a factor
in your business. Now, the human element in the
business has to be considered, and in the case of
accident what reparation you can make must be made
45
as a charge upon the business.
What Chamberlain pointed out was that all contractual freedoms entailed 
obligations of some sort and that in the rase of injury, the employer
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 51, c. 253.
44 Ib id ., c. 231.
45 Ib id ., c . 211.
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could not escape the burden of liability any more than he could avoid 
liability for mechanical repairs.
The Bill moved quickly after Third Reading, through the House of 
Lords, to Royal Assent on August 6 , 1897. Its limitations were many and 
would become magnified in years to come. The 60% of workers not covered 
would grow louder in their demands for coverage. The expense of the Bill 
on the trades involved would continue to pose problems. The nagging ques­
tion of Government responsibility was tied in to both these problems: hew
liable should the Government be in cases of insolvency or in cases not 
covered? Obviously, the final line had not been reached.
However, two important steps were taken in 1897. In the first place, 
the old problem of “common employment" was resolved. It was not so much 
abandoned as ignored, for this Act provided for "compensation for all acci­
dents and without inquisition .. .and [did] not raise the question of common
46
employment at a ll ."  Those industries covered under the Act (mining, 
quarrying, engineering, and railways) no longer had the "common employment 
doctrine" to twist to their respective interpretations. In effect, that 
1838 case of Priestley v. Fowler had been legislatively overruled.
The second important achievement was that this Act abandoned the 
principle of a quasi-criminal penalty for damages, as demonstrated in law 
suits and substituted the principle that a man who is injured in an indus­
trial employment has a civil right to compensation as a part of the proceeds 
of that employment. This would not immediately or completely eliminate
46
London Times, leader; 5 /4 /9 7 , p. 9 , c. 3.
61
employer/employee friction but by removing "personalities" from the action, 
it would help foster a realization on both sides of the need for safety and 
for accountability.
As to whether this Act and its meaning were the correct method of 
changing the existing situation is very controversial. Looked at from a 
modem stance, it is only natural to question whether a legal responsibility 
existed or if even a moral one did. However, in assessing the 1697 Act, 
consideration must be given to the conditions of the day: a growing indus­
trial class and with it a huge growth in work-related injuries; the poten­
tial for injury increasing as fast as the litigation resulting from the 1880 
Employers' Liability Act; and the continued debates over "common employment"* 
job safety, subcontracting, and contracting-out. These were the vital 
issues of 1897 and resoution of them lay at the heart of the 1897 Act. What 
occurred in 1897, what had begun to occur in 1680, and even in 1838, was a 
perception on the part of all parties to the issue that employer liability , 
in light of the current industrial growth, was a fact. The 1897 Act re­
affirmed that fact and changed the issue of liability from a court procedure 
to, in effect, an insurance provision. In so doing, the Act laid out a 
ground work for social insurance and social responsibility.
CHAPTER 6 - 1900 EXTENSION ACT
With the understanding (albeit implicit) that the 1897 Workmen's 
Compensation Act was experimental! the leave to amend that Act at some 
future point was understood by most M .P .'s  and probably by the population 
at large. Therefore! when in 1900, a private bill (as opposed to a govern­
ment bill) to amend it was introduced! there was little opposition from any 
side in either House. The Bill proposed to include farm laborers under the 
existing Act, an idea which had been mentioned in 1897 though not thought 
wise at the time. What then was the incentive! now, in 1900?
Perhaps the greatest incentive was the insurance rates. Since 1897! 
these had steadily fallen ar more and more industries insured their workers. 
Therefore! the tremendous cost of the 1897 Act, which had at one point 
seemed a valid argument against compensation coverage! was no longer rele­
vant. Other lesser reasons (lesser in scope though greater in implication) 
were that many farm laborers were leaving the farms and moving into the 
industries included under the 1897 Act, perhaps in part because these did 
have coverage, that recent bye-elections had demonstrated the laborers' 
dissatisfaction with the current Act,* and the fact that extension or not, 
an employer was still personally liable for any direct negligence under 
Common Law.
There were, of course, problems with extending the Act. Opponents to 
farm laborer coverage observed that this area of labor had few accidents and 
that the majority of farmers, being men of modest means, could hardly
P a rlia m en ta ry  D e b a te s , 1 9 0 0 , V o l. 8 0 , c .  1419 .
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afford the burden of even one accident-liability claim. Although there 
was in 1900 no agricultural depression as there had been in 1897, now as 
then, agriculture itself was felt to be too unstable an industry to disturb 
with such a Bill. But underlying these objections was the basic and per­
sisting uncertainty as to hew the 1897 Act worked and what it was costing 
to both master and servant. There had not been enough time to observe long- 
range effects of the Act. Without this analysis it was deemed by some 
unwise to pursue further in the direction taken by the Workmen's Compensa­
tion Act of 1897. For example, the Earl of Wemyss in the House of Lords
2
objected to the Bill as "sentimental, liberty-interference." He told the 
House that if he had to insure his laborers, the cost would be deducted from 
their wages.^
Such objections notwithstanding, a Bill was presented in February of 
1900. Three political parties were represented in the authorship: Conserva­
tive (Edward Goulding, William Carlile, and Charles G iles); Unionist (Lord 
Willoughby de Eresby); and Liberal-Unionist (Sir Cameron G u ll ) .4 The Bill 
was simple and straightforward: the 1897 Act was to be extended to apply to
"all employment on or in or about agricultural work, and a laborer in such 
employment would be deemed to be a 'workman* within the meaning" of the
5
1897 Act. A debate on the Second Reading of the Bill was scheduled for 
March 21, 1900.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 86, c. 38.
Ib id ., c. 38.
P a rliam en tary  D e b a te s , V o l. 78 , c .  412 .
S e s s io n a l  P a p ers , 1 9 0 0 , V o l. 5 -  B i l l  # 1 4 , £ l .
64
The "debate" could not have been more amicable. Goulding pointed
out that as things stood, the 1880 Act was of no value to a farm laborer:
they had no lawyers to consult, no financial means available to take action,
£
and even if action was taken, damage awards went to pay for the litigation.
Home Secretary Sir Matthew Ridley assured Government support of the B ill,
asking for only a few minor changes in the wording such as the definition of 
7
a laborer. The Government's willingness to change the law was reminiscent 
of the last discussion in 1897 when the Government acknowledged the event- 
ality of change. In 1900, it meant that this Bill, though introduced by 
back-benchers and concerning a very emotional topic, would have no trouble 
in being enacted.
The remainder of the Second Reading debate revolved around self- 
congratulations and the problem of litigation. Sir Samuel Hoare expressed 
amazement at the success of the 1897 Act: "We had no idea that the lia-
8
bility  incurred would be anything like so small as experience'1 has shown it. 
Sir James Joicey, while not so full of praises, did acknowledge that " . . .t h e  
common sense of employers and workmen has made to a large extent for the
9
deficiencies of the Act itself. John Lawson of York effused that since the 
Act had proven to be a great success, it was not only right to cover farm 
laborers, adding that this would encourage farmers to insure as it had 
caused other trades to do over the past two years. *78910
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, c. 1405.
7 Ib id ., c. 1413.
8 Ib id ., c. 1418.
9 Ib id ., c. 1417.
10
Ib id ., c. 1409 (1897 Act actually went into effect in 1898).
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Litigation had increased according to Arthur Jeffreys.11 One had
only to look in The Times for evidence. Although his position is not clear,
the assunption is that as far as he was concerned, that increase was enough
to judge the 1897 Act a mistake. Herbert Asquith, sounding still upset over
the failure of his Bill in 1893, was quick to state that the real cause of
nine-tenths of the litigation was "the manner in which the Act was drawn"
whereby a series of "artificial distinctions" between the various categories
of the working classes had established "illogical compartments which [had]
12
taxed all the resources of Her Majesty's judges to interpret." Another 
explanation for the high rate of litigation, given by James Kenyon of 
Lancashire, was the tendency of the insurance companies to contest all 
claims in order to avoid paying.
Neither congratulations nor the subject of litigation and its prob­
lems was enough to bring on long, heated debates (such as some of those in 
1897) and the Bill was sent to a Committee to be amended. Magnifying the 
growing importance of Compensation and Trade-Unionism, the merits of the 
Bill would not be debated by a Committee of the whole House but by a Stand­
ing Committee on Trade. The first amendment was to more clearly define 
agriculture to include "horticulture, forestry, . . .husbandry" of any sort
and include livestock, poultry, or bee breeding, and the growth of any
13
fruit and vegetable. The second amendment defined a "workman" in
14
agriculture as being "any laborer in agriculturo."
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. BO, c. 1423. 
Ib id ., c. 1424.
Sessional Papers, Vol. 5 - bill #165.
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When the Bill came back to the Commons in June for consideration, the 
major point of debate arose over the language in § 1 which provided coverage 
for any laborer employed by a farmer who "habitually" hired one or more 
workmen. What did "habitually" signify? Walter Long, President of the 
Board of Agriculture, insisted the application of the Bill be limited in 
this way for otherwise "the result will be to cast responsibility upon a
large number of very small people who may have to compensate" men in the
15
same financial status as themselves. Without the word "habitually," he 
warned, the Government would not back the Bill. This did not define 
"habitually," of course. Nor did John Lawson when he explained that as 
most small concerns had little machinery and employed laborers infrequently, 
the risk of injury was extremely l o w . W h a t  Long and Lawson did so was to 
end discussion of the concept of "habitually" until a future House of Lords 
debate attempted to define it.
On Consideration, the Bill was adjusted to provide for subcontracting
work in the pattern of the 1897 Act. The exception here was that if the
subcontracting employer provided and used machinery for the job, he alone
17
would be liable for the injuries to the subcontracted employee. A second
amendment provided coverage of the Act to those laborers who occasionally
18
engaged in non-farm types of work for the farmer. These were small 
changes, expansions and clarifications of the original Bill and the fairly
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 84, e. 530.
Ib id ., c. 532.
Sessional Papers, Vol. 5 - Bill #165, $ 1 (2 ) .
• i
18
Ibid 1(3 ).
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positive sentiment marked by these changes carried the Bill through Third
Reading and into the House of Lords on July 5.
As in the Commons, the mood of the Lords was fairly positive. Vi uni
Crofc., Lord Privy Seal, noted three positive effects of the 1897 Act
though its interpretation was often being tested in court , th* piiru ipie
behind it was well understood; apprehensions in regard to both employe* vnd
employee had proved unfounded; and the proof that the Act was working lay in
19
the fact that the insurance companies had lowered their rates. It was
here in Second Reading debate, that the term "habitually” was clarified.
Former Attorney General Lord A1verstone compared "habitually employs" to a
habitual drunkard; one who is not always drunk but whose habit is to drink.
Similarly the farmer did not always employ laborers but his habit was to do 
20
8 0 .
One notable amendment proposed in the House of Lords and subsequently 
adopted by the Commons concerned clarification of "machinery." In ^ 1 (2 )  a 
provision was made that when a subcontractor used his own machinery for a 
job, such as threshing or plowing, any resulting injuries to subcontracted 
employees were to be his liability. Fearing "machinery" would be misinter­
preted, the Lords approved an amendment which added the words "driven by
21
mechanical power" to "machinery."  The significance of this move was to 
place immediate liability on the employer for injuries from horses and other
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 85, c. 571-573. 
Ib id ., c. 764.
I b i d . , c. 767.
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non-mechanical farm implements with recourse against the subcontractor in 
court (as the 1897 Act had provided) while making an exception for those 
injuries sustained by a subcontracted employee fran machines the subcon­
tractor furnished. The reasoning behind this is not clear from the debates. 
Howeveri as farm machinery could perhaps cause more serious and costly 
injuries) the Amendment may have been an attempt to alleviate costly lia­
bility and litigation costs for the employer. A subsequent Standing
Committee amendment to include horses with "machines driven by mechanical
22
power" was defeated. This one case then was to be the only exception 
to employer liability in this area.
The Bill came back to the House of Commons on July 17 and the Lords' 
amendment was agreed to. Royal assent was given July 30. This very simple 
extension of the 1897 Act) a back-bencher Bill under Lord Salisbury's 
Government thus slipped into law. A further 1,700,000 workers in Great 
Britain now became eligible for compensation benefits. The ease with which 
this Bill passed was possibly due to Britain's on-going involvement in South 
Africa in the Boer War. Yet the passage of this Act was accompanied by 
dissenting voices, and as in 1897, prophecies of docm.
The reason for the grumbling did not lie in the area of employer lia­
bility but rather in an increasing fear on the part of many Government and 
private individuals that the extension of the 3897 Act was bringing ever 
closer the dangerous specter of Socialism. The Earl of Wemyss in fact 
projected this occurence when he noted that after farm laborers the next
22 P arliam en tary  D e b a te s , V o l. 85 , c .  1431 .
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group to be covered would be domestic servants. Not even Viscount Cross*
glib reply to this indictment ("sufficient for the day is the evil 
24
thereof" ) was enough to still the questioning that had now begun.
Broadhurst had explained during the Third Reading debates his feeling that 
Parliament would in the near future have to consider a plan that involved 
state contribution to compensation. His reasoning was almost noble and 
altruistic: "We should all take a share in bearing the burden of those
undertakings which are necessary to the maintenance of the nation and of 
the Empire.
Indeed a profound change was in the process of occuring. The 1897 
Act in itself had been almost revolutionary. It had allowed for compensa­
tion in certain industries as a natural right. Now that right had been 
extended almost effortlessly to a major group of workers. Even as Broadhurst 
and others worked on the 1900 Act, they were beginning to marshall their 
resources towards those alterations which would be the focus of the 1906 
Act. At the core of these was Government responsibility or as Wemyss saw 
it , Socialism.
23
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CHAPTER 7 - 1 9 0 6  WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Problems other than coverage of farm laborers had grown during the 
period between 1897 and 1906. The dilemma of how to enforce payment of 
compensation was demonstrated in a 1900 case, Bailey v. Plant. 1 Bailey had 
been .swarded a weekly payment of 2s 6d as the result of an arbitration hear­
ing in 1899. One year later the defendant. Plant, was 18 weeks in arrears 
on those payments. Bailey called for a judgement summons (a procedure of 
the 1869 Debtor's Act, Section 5) to determine if the defendant could pay 
and if not, to ask that he be committed to Debtor’s Prison. The local judge 
of Crewe County ruled that the defendant did have the financial means to 
make good the debt owed, thereby nullifying a prison sentence. However, the 
judge could not force the defendant to pay under the provisions of the 1897 
Act.
Other "loopholes" of the Act were a ruling in 1904 that deduction from 
wages to cover premiums was allowable under the Truck Act of 1896 and a 
1906 ruling by a judge in Southwark County that compensation could be
reduced when an employee was deemed suitable for work (despite the fact
2
that the reduction was used to force the employee back to work). The cen­
tral debate, then, on the 1897 Act was how widely did its enforcement 
depend on Court interpretation and was this creating a signficant disparity 
between legislative intention and administrative execution. This issue was
Law Tim*s, Vol. 83, p. 459.
Parliamentary Debate, 1906, Vol. 162, c. 1048; Vol. 152, c. 1076-1081; 
Vol. 161, c. 728.
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not tempered by the fact that since 1897 more and more industries had begun 
to insure themselves voluntarily.
Another concern in 1906 was the growing demand for government control 
of compensation through regulation of the insurance companies. Henry
3
Broadhurst* 8 prediction of 1897 that the Government would become the ulti­
mate social overseer was not a concept well-regarded by the Liberal Govem- 
ment of 1906 or even by many Opposition members. The complications and 
responsibilities of such an undertaking were not to be a part of this 1906 
legislation. For, though consensus may have admitted the fact that compul­
sory insurance and government regulation thereof were soon to be reality, 
this Government was prepared only to protect more workers, protect them 
more effectively, and tie up the loose ends of the 1880, 1897, and 1900 Acts.
This sentiment was neatly expressed in a 1904 Departmental Committee
5
Report on Workmen's Compensation:
The questions for the future must be. . .what 
amendments are required in the law providing 
for that relief as regards the general method 
and detailed means of affording it , whether 
any and what changes are required in the 
extent or limits of that relief, or in the 
security for its provisions and maintenance, 
and whether similar privileges should be 
extended to classes of work people not new 
within the law.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 51 - 1897, c. 231.
4
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 166, c . 333.
5
Sessional Papers, 1904, Vol. 88 - Department of the Home Office
6 Ib id ., p. 12.
72
This Conmittee had found no actual increase in litigation from 1897 to 1904 
and no marked effect of the Act on safety. But it did find both the 1897
7
and 1900 Acts to have benefitted workers generally. However, expressing 
the caution of the day and forewarning of the 1906 Liberal Government's 
cautioni it did not* in 1904* make any recommendations to extend the Act
0
but expressed only the suggestion that enforcement by made more efficient.
When the Bill of 1906 was introduced* it was termed a Consolidation 
Bill. Herbert Gladstone* Home Secretary* explained that "the time has 
arrived for a wide extension of the Act of 1897 to every class of labour* 
and in the Bill a new principle is adopted which differentiates it from the
9
1897 A ct." This new principle was to include all workers unless expressly 
mentioned rather than* as in 1897* to exclude all workers except those 
named. Its title then was from the very first at least slightly misleading: 
it did consolidate those 7 .5  million workers of the two previous Acts* but 
it also drew in almost every other worker in Great Britain. A more correct 
term might have been an "incorporation" Bill.
Among those included were seamen whan not at sea. The Merchant
Act of 1867 covered men at sea* under the liability of the captain.
However* in port, these seamen were for technically legal reasons no longer 
under the direct supervision of the captain. Previous attempts to allow
Sessional Papers* 1904* Vol. 88 - Department of the Home Office* p. 36-37. 
Ibid .* p. 111.
Parliamentary Debates* Vol. 154* c. 887.
10 I b id .*  c .  888.
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for th°ir coverage (1893, 1897) had failed. Now, however, under the
Consolidation Bill of 1906, they were to have ae much coverage as any other
worker. Small employees of either industry or service trades would also be
liable for injuries, if they employed five or more workers. Also included
were agricultural employers of more than one habitual worker. ** Domestic
servants, shop assistants, and "out-workers" (people who worked in their
homes doing things such as spinning) were excluded from the Bill as origi-
12
nally presented. Perhaps the most novel concept of the Bill was coverage
13
for workers who contracted industry-related diseases. The diseases cov­
ered were lead, mercury, phosphorous, and arsenic poisoning, anthrax and
14
ankylostomiasis. This last was commonly known as "miner's anemia" caused 
by subterranean work and certain parasites found underground. Anthrax was 
a disease of cattle which attacked workers who handled wool, hair, bristles, 
hides or skins of livestock.
There were two other new items in the B ill. The first was that weekly 
compensation would be based on the average wage earned in the two weeks 
prior to injury or if the worker had been employed for less than two weeks,
the weekly figure would be determined based on the average wage for work "in
15
the same trade, in the same employment, and in the same d istrict ." The
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 154, c. 887. 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 154, c. 918, c. 927. 
Ib id ., c. 890.
Sessional Papers, 1906, Vol. 5, p. 28.
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second item was that a ’’medical referee, M a doctor appointed by the local 
court's registrar, could be requested by either employer or employee to 
grant a final medical judgement as to the nature and severity of the injury 
in question. Such referee was to be paid by the party requesting him and
could also be used to review the status of an injury once payments had
. 16 
begun.
Though there was strong debate for compulsory insurance and even
government-supported insurance, the Government was not at this time prepared
to accept the concept. John Wilson's comment that "the support of an
17
injured workman should be a lien on the funds of the nation" was apparently
not persuasive. Neither was William MacArthur's Second Reading Amendment
seeking "such recognition and guarantee of insurance as to prevent the
18
defeat of legal expectation ..." of compensation settlement. As Gladstone
notodj "The workmen! having been given the right to compensation by the
19
Statute, shall as far as possible be guaranteed that compensation..."
In other words! the statute was enough in and of itself and did not need 
to be complicated by Government intervention any more than absolutely 
necessary.
There was one objection! however! which could not be so easily cast 
aside. The Bill provided for coverage for all but a few employment
16
17
18
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 154, 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 155, 
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19 I b id . ,  c . 542.
positions. Included in the Bill were even Government workers, who had 
previously not been allowed compensation in the past. The reasoning behind 
this dated back to the 1880 Act which allowed for rights of action. The 
Government had then declared that no suit could be made against the Crown 
and, therefore, Government employees were not eligible under the provisions 
of the 1880 Act. Now this present Bill would give them coverage on a civil 
rather than criminal basis. But some groups were still not covered; domes­
tic servants, soldiers, and out-workers in particular. These exclusions 
served only to encourage these forms of work, particularly out-working, as 
ways to avoid liability.
The Bill did pass the Second Reading stage on a voice vote on April 10 
1906 and went to Committee hearings. The greatest amount of debate centered 
on when coverage should begin. In 1897, the provision was for coverage 
after the first two weeks of injury. In Committee, amendments were intro­
duced to change this to seven days and then to three days. The major 
question was what would be the additional cost of such moves. Figures for 
the major industries shewed that changing the qualification period frem 14 
to 7 days would result in a 44% increase in premium payments for the col­
lieries, 25% for ironstone industries, 47% for engineering (construction)
20
firms, 40% for shipbuilding, and 26% for textile mills. A reduction from 
14 days to 3 days would result in a 33% increase in premiums for the tex­
tile industries, the only industry of the above-named which had been
21
surveyed for that particular change. The three-day wait period was
20 P a rlia m en ta ry  D e b a te s , V o l. 1 6 3 , c .  870.
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adopted in Committee by a vote of 30 to 21 and with a few other changes, 
the Bill came before the Commons for consideration.
It took from November 29 to December 6 to iron out the Amendments 
proposed in Committee and to allay the lingering doubts of some M .P .'s . 
Foremost in the debates was the issue of compulsory and/or Government- 
guaranteed insurance. Thomas Cochrane and Aretas Akers-Douglas moved for
an amendment for safeguarding the issue of insurance policies granted to
22
small employers by approving or disapproving the insurance agencies. * In 
the discussion which followed the seconding of the Amendment, Gladstone, 
questioning whether the Amendment was proposing a State guarantee of solv­
ency of insurance companies, objected to this type of action as interfer-
23
ence with a company's methods of conducting business. The Government, 
he stated, was not prepared to make such a move although it would work with 
the Postmaster-General on having certain facilities available for advisement 
to insurance companies. Sydney Buxton, Postmaster-General, explained that 
if the Government put itself into an agency position, approving or disap­
proving insurance companies, then should an approved company fail to make 
good on compensation claims, the State could be held liable to fulfill the 
company's obligations. The wiser approach, he felt, would be for the
Government, through the Post Office, to act solely as an information center
24
with no legal liability attached. The Amendment was withdrawn at this
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 166, c. 326.. 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 166, c. 330.
24 I b i d . ,  c .  334.
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point with the understanding that its substance would continue to be studied
25
by the Government.
The previously-approved three-day waiting period before becoming
eligible for compensation was amended to seven days with the additional
provision that benefits for injuries resulting in more than 14 days of lost
employment would include a retroactive payment for the first seven days of 
26
injury. Another amendment was approved that provided for compensation
27
coverage for domestic servants. Finally, an attempt to abolish the
"double-litigation" rights of an employee, whereby compensation could be
28
collected while suing for criminal damages, was not successful. Parlia­
ment, while recognizing the advantages to the civil settlement of the Bill, 
wos not prepared to abridge Common Law rights in return for such benefits.
The Bill moved to Third Reading stage. It was to cover an additional
6,000,000 workers, bringing the total number of workers covered to about 13 
29
million. As the 1897 Act had provided, contracting-out was allowed if the 
benefits matched the B ill 's  provisions and sub-contracting was still gov­
erned by the same rules of the previous Act. As mentioned above, certain 
work-related diseases were now eligible for compensation. One change, 
made perhaps to accommodate Cochrane's earlier Amendment, was that where
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 166, c. 337. 
Ib id ., c. 353.
Ib id ., c. 1059.
28
Ib id ., c. 839.
29 P arliam en tary  D e b a te s , V o l. 1 67 , c .  697.
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the employer went bankrupt and compensation was due, the employ ^s)
involved would be vested with the rights of the employer, as regarded pro-
30
ceeds from the bankruptcy.
The weekly benefit, based on the previous two weeks of work, was set
at 50% of that average weekly wage. The benefit could be decreased if the
31
worker was employed at another job during the period of injury. Also a 
provision was made whereby benefits which could last for six months or more 
could be settled by a lump sum figure, such sun arrived at either at arbitra­
tion or in the form of an immediate life annuity equal to 75% of the annual
32
wage as determined by the National Debt Commissioners.
The House of Lords debated the Bill on December 14 and 18, following 
Second Reading. On December 19, a Report of their Amendments was issued 
and the Bill was read a third time and taken to the Commons. The amendments 
were insignificant as far as changing the ideology of the Bill and were 
quickly dealt with in the Commons. On December 21, Royal Assent was given 
to the 1906 Workmen's Compensation Act.
There were issues left pending with the passage of this Act. Casual, 
part-time workers were not covered. Out workers were also excluded. There 
was some dispute whether the list of dangerous diseases covered all 
industrial-related diseases. However, these problems diminish in the face 
of what the 1906 Act did accomplish. The concept of Workmen's Compensation
Sessional Papers, 1906, Vol. 5 - Bill #366, p. 6 . 
Ib id ., p. 20.
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had been vastly broadened. Thirteen million workers were covered; all large 
industries were included; domestic servants, once considered a private enter­
prise, now had legally available benefits; and a totally new dimension, that 
of industrial disease, had been recognized as "work-related injury."
What this Act provided for was incorporation of injuries of all sorts 
under the law. The tentativeness and experimentation of the 1897 and 1900 
Acts had b e o  eliminated. The definition of "worker" was no longer avail­
able to only a few industries, thereby erasing the continual debate of who 
was covered and who was not. The problems that remained were technical in 
nature. There was no longer any dispute as to the right of a worker to 
receive compensation nor any question as to whether the employer should be 
liable for the injuries. In effect, the Act was important not only for what 
it accomplished in 1906, but also for what it would signify in the future. 
Though the State was not yet to become the insurer, it was not placed in the 
role of overseer. The State had implicitly become the protector of the 
majority of the workers by acknowledging their rights to compensation. The 
concept of State Insurance was thus only a matter of time, and coverage of 
casual, day-laborers and out-workers would soon follow.
What the 1906 Act demonstrated was elasticity. By redefining "worker" 
to include all workers, those not specifically mentioned could easily be 
included at a later date. The concept of "injury" had been expanded to 
include disease and those diseases not specifically mentioned (or perhaps 
even thought of) would be easy to incorporate. The maturing stage of 
Employer Liability had been reached after almost seventy years of hard work. 
The strictures of the Priestley v. Fowler decision had once and for all been
set aside.
CHAPTER 8 ~ CONCLUSION
After July 1 , 1907, all employers of persons who cams under the 
definition given in the 1906 Statute of "workman" were liable to such work­
men for any injury, fatality, or disease occuring during the course of 
employment. The definition of "workman" was wide and included labourers, 
servants, miners, engineers, and many others. The compensation was fixed 
in amount but awardable regardless of the type of injury except in the case 
of willful self-injury. A long road had been travelled on from the first 
Act in 1880 which had given employees a right to sue for compensation to 
the present Act which gave employees a right to collect compensation.
Of course, the situation did not remain static after 1906. Social 
reform, as heady perhaps as spring fever, was in the air, influencing 
Great Britain towards more and more changes. Women's Suffrage, Irish 
Nationalism and Labor Rebellion were but three of a series of kaleidoscopic 
movements that symbolized a general rebellion against the times. But one 
of the more important events as it relates to this paper was the advent of 
National Insurance in 1911.
The plan had been discussed in 1909 and a general framework had been 
established in that year.* Its goal was to provide for insurance against 
sickness and disability for workers between the ages of sixteen and seventy 
whose incomes were L I60 or less and for manual laborers regardless of income. 
It was a three-party contributory scheme with employer, employee, and the
Data for this Act is from Havighhurst, Britain in Transition (Chicago, 
1979), p. 104.
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Government each subsidizing the plan. Under this Act, practically the whole 
of the wage force was insured, some fourteen million workers. The Act also 
included unemployment benefits for some of the workers, again on a contribu­
tory basis. This meant that the worker would now be covered not only for 
work-related injuries but also for illness. He no longer had to worry that 
his family would go without food should he fall sick.
The second important change after 1906 was the adjustments made to 
the Workmen's Compensation Law. In 1925, a Consolidation Act combined the 
benefits of 1906 and 1923 (another Consolidation Act), reduced the benefit­
waiting period from seven to three days, and Incorporated all previous legis-
2
lation under one Act. Prom all outward appearances, compensation was a 
fixture. There had been little partisan debate in 1906 and in 1925 there 
was even less debate. This is not an extremely surprising finding. The 
people of Great Britain had come to appreciate Workmen's Compensation, and 
for an M.P. to haggle about it in London could quite possibly have meant the 
end of his political career.
Looking back at early court suits, hearings, and debates there exists 
a logical pattern in the acceptance of compensation. The manner in which 
the principle of compensation came to be accepted had been slow ana delib­
erate, conservative (even in 1897) and precise. To understand this, a 
review of Compensatory laws is needed. Where exactly the whole question 
began is, of course, difficult lo pin-point. Certainly though, a change was 
forecast in 1838 in the Priestley decision. Realistically, the case had 
little within it to merit great attention for it was but a very simple,
Except for the 1880 Act, discussed supra.
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cut-and-dried, tort decision. What did make it important was its substance. 
It brought to light a very puzzling question: if an employer was responsible
for the actions of his employee towards a stranger, why should he not also 
be responsible when that Mstranger" was one of his own workers? Even then 
t l N dilemma might have been ignored were it not for subsequent judicial 
pronouncements which embellished the concept of non-liability to such an 
extent as to protect an employer from every having to answer for the injury 
of his employee.
These cases then set-up and encouraged the questioning of employer 
liability . When a Select Committee began hearings and debates over the 
issue, one fact became clear: though there were many who saw no cause for
an employer to be held liable, there were others who refused to let the 
matter rest. Men like Robert Lowe and Alexander MacDonald were not willing 
to accept the maxim No wrong arises to one consenting (Volenti non fit  
Injuria). If nothing else, they wanted to probe the reasoning behind the 
maxim and they wanted an explanation for the dichotomy between liability 
towards strangers and non-liability towards employees.
Though the 1876-1877 hearings led to no concrete recommendations, 
the questions left unanswered were enough to bring about attempted legis­
lation in each year after the hearings until the Liberal Government in 1880 
was compelled to take up the issue in earnest. The central theme of 1880 
was that those who favored liability in actuality advocated the right of 
the employee to sue his employer for injuries received. Common Law did 
include this right already where the employer was directly involved ( i .e . ,  
criminal negligence). In 1880, the forces behind workers' rights wanted 
rights of action where the employer had delegated his duty. In essence,
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this had been the dispute in Priestley. In legal terms, the demand was for 
responsibility in cases of indirect criminal negligence.
The passage of the 1880 Act, while bringing relief to many workers 
also brought problems to both sides of the issue. By making liability 
a criminal responsibility, litigation was needed to get claim settlements.
The increase in litigation and with it delays in settlement, court expenses, 
large legal fees, and growing animosity between employer and employee corn- 
bined to force a change in policy. This change was brought about through 
the 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act. Its most important function was to 
sever the relationship between liability and criminal negligence. When 
liability moved into the civil area of law, putting the onus on the employer 
to pay compensation unless he could prove self-injury, the problems inherent 
in litigation were substantially diminished.
There was still a problem with compensation. The 1897 Act covered 
only five clasies of workers: miners, quarriers, engineers, railway workers,
and factory workers. They comprised less than 50% of the total British work­
force, leaving those not included still dependant upon the 1860 Act. It was 
only natural, therefore, that in 1900, the Act should be extended to include 
another large group of workers: farm laborers. What was even mors fas­
cinating about the 1900 Act was that it was a private members' B ill. The 
fact that a private members' bill dealing with such a controversial subject 
could get enacted i to law demonstrates the changing attitude towards 
compensation. The focus was no longer on civil negligence itself, but on 
who could be covered umler such negligence. It was no longer the "right 
to compensation" which formed the debate but rather onto whom the right
should be accorded.
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Despite the great changes made between 1880 and 1900, a problem still
existed. The 1897 and 1900 Acts covered only those workers specifically
named. What was now needed was an Act to cover all workers except those
specifically named. This was the basis for the 1906 Workmen's Compensation
Act. In the words of the Act it was:
An Act to consolidate and amend the Law with 
respect to Compensation to Workmen for Irjuries
3
suffered in the course of their Employment.
This was exactly what it did. It combined the benefits of 1897 and 1900, 
added other groups of workers such as seamen, Government workers, and domes­
tic servants, provided clear language for contracting-out and sub-contracting, 
and added a group of diseases to be consiuered as work-related injuries.
This most important Act incorporated existing laws and added timely changes. 
Subsequently, in 1923 and 1925, Acts would be passed which further consoli­
dated the laws and set ip certain standards for making claims. But it was 
in 1906 that the Government first took the step to gather together all the 
factors of compensation and put them under one Act.
There was one Act that wae not included, however. The 1880 Act 
remained outside of the waning of Workmen's Compensation. It was different 
from the subsequent Acts though It was because of its enactment that the 
other Acts were made possible. However, it could not be incorporated 
because it operated upon a different principle. It gave workers the right 
to sue their employers, to instigate criminal litigation. Pram 1897 on, 
the dominant philosophy was that workers had a right to collect
3
Statutes of the Realm - 6 Edward 7, Cap. 58.
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compensation. The two concepts could not, therefore, be reconciled and the 
1880 Act stands alone, an anomoly to some perhaps. If it is an anomoly, 
it is a very vital one, for it paved the way for future compensation as a 
worker's right when it made compensation a subject of legal suit.
If the Act of 1880 stands outside of the compensation issue, then 
certainly the whole concept of "common employment" does also. This sub­
ject, so heavily debated in 1876-1877, 1080, and even in 1897 was never 
resolved. Its premise, that two people who work together (physically 
together, on the same jcb site, for the same employer and many other 
definitions) are responsible for aa^h other's actions, was never fully 
approved or disapproved. It was simply ignored. When compensation became 
a civil right, the question of "common employment" no longer nad to bo dealt 
with. It was simply shunted aside and forgotten because its premise no 
longer had be considered.
Other issues such as wages being a consideration for the risk of the 
job and liability creating carelessness in the workers were also dropped by 
1906, There was no clear resolution on them, no study was ever shown to 
prove that workers would be more careless (or were mors careless) if they 
could collect liability , and there was never a true consensus on the ques­
tion of the determination of wages in relation to risks.
What was dealt with, carefully and completely, was employer liability. 
The development of a legal and moral responsibility on the part of the 
employer towards his employees was fascinating ir the changing principles 
involved. From non-1lability to a right to legal action took forty-two 
years (1838-1880). Another seventeen years were needed to change that 
legal, criminal action into a civil doctrine, turning a right to sue into
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a right to collect. A further nine years widened the definition of "worker,H 
and expanded the meaning of "injury" to include certain diseases. Workmen's 
Compensation, as it grew and expanded became more and more accepted as a 
basic right and not just a privilege. It grew best because it grew slowly, 
because of the hard work of certain outstanding M .P . 's ,  and because in all 
the debates and discussions, no one ever quite lost sight of its true 
purpose: the protection of the "human element."
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